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A number of nations have sought to buttress judicial inde-
pendence through constitutional provisions prohibiting reductions
in judicial compensation.1 The Framers of the United States Con-
stitution included such a provision in article III, section 1, known
as the compensation or diminution clause:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts . . .
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office.
Though the meaning of this clause would appear to be reasonably
clear in a stable economy,2 a crucial textual ambiguity becomes
readily apparent in an unstable economy. It is unclear whether
the language "shall not be diminished" in the compensation
clause protects the real economic value3 or the nominal value! of
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of Law, Ohio State University College of Law.
The author would like to express his appreciation to his colleague, Michael
Perry, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Howard Silverman,
J.D.. Ohio State University College of Law, 1976, for his research assistance. The
author would like to disclose that his father currently sits on the Court of Appeals
of the Third Circuit, but is not a party to the judges' recent lawsuit for back salary.
Responsibility for the views expressed herein is solely that of the author.
1 See, e.g., ARoEN. CONST. art. 96 (1853, amended 1860, 1866, 1898,
1957); Ausm. CoNsr. pt. V, ch. III, art. 72 (as amended, 1946); BRAZ. CONST.
art. 113 (as amended, 1969); COLOM. CONST. art. 160 (1886, amended 1945);
MEx. CONST. art. 94 (1917). There is a similar provision for the President in
the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
2 The only serious questions which have been litigated under the compen-
sation clause are whether it prevents reduction of the pensions of retired judges
and whether it prevents the imposition of an income tax on judicial salaries.
See notes 29 & 94 infra.
3 The real economic value of a given sum is the amount of goods or
services which can be purchased with that sum, i.e., its "purchasing power." Mc-
GRAw-HILL DicTIoNAY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 485 (2d ed. 1973). Thus, the
real economic value of a judge's salary is its purchasing power. It should be
noted, however, that the real economic value of judicial compensation is also a
function of work loads. The case loads of the federal judges have increased
dramatically, particularly in recent years. See notes 57-70 & accompanying text
infra. Yet Congress has not accorded the federal judiciary corresponding pro-
ductivity increases, producing a further decline in real judicial income. Id.
4 Nominal value is used to refer to the statutorily stated salaries as dis-
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judicial salaries. If construed as protecting only the nominal value
of judicial salaries, the constitutional guaranty can be quickly evis-
cerated by persistent and substantial inflation.5  If the clause as-
sures only the real value of judicial salaries, Congress could reduce
the nominal value of those salaries during a period of deflation.' If
the clause is interpreted to protect the real economic value of judi-
cial compensation, a further issue arises: Does the compensation
clause impose an affirmative legal obligation or merely a moral
duty upon Congress to maintain the real income of the federal
judiciary?
Historically, Congress has not interpreted the compensation
clause as protecting the real value of judicial compensation. In-
deed, it has been chronically remiss in maintaining the real income
of the federal judiciary. There have been several periods of par-
ticularly virulent inflation when, despite shocking declines in real
judicial income, Congress has refused to raise judicial salaries.
Since 1967, when increases in judicial salaries became linked
to increases in congressional salaries,' the problem has been ex-
acerbated. It is considered poor politics to raise high-level gov-
ernmental salaries, which are perceived as more than ample by the
bulk of the voters. During periods of serious inflationary pres-
sure, the government regularly calls upon the public to make sacri-
fices in the interest of economic stability, and lawmakers are
therefore particularly reluctant to raise their own salaries.8 More-
over, legislators tend not to be as dependent as judges on their sal-
aries for, unlike judges, legislators have substantial expense ac-
counts and often receive additional compensation.
tinguished from the purchasing power of the salaries. See McGRAw-HILL DIC-
TIONARY OF MolEmU EcoNoMics 377 (2d ed. 1973) (referring to this concept as
the "money wage").
5 This is vividly illustrated by the recent experience of Argentina, whose
constitution contains a clause nearly identical to the compensation clause of the
United States Constitution. ARGEN. CoNsT. art. 96 (1853, amended 1860, 1866,
1898, 1957). With inflation increasing the official cost of living index by 335
percent in 1975, the President of the Argentine Supreme Court, until recently,
was being paid less than a waiter. De Onis, Isabelita's Terrible Legacy, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 21, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 15, 54.
6 See note 29 infra.
7 This linkage took place when Congress established the Commission on
Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries to recommend to the President salary
changes for high-level officials in the three branches of government. 2 U.S.C.
§§ 351 etseq. (1970).
8 This reluctance of Congress to act produced a six-year freeze, from 1969
to 1975, in which the federal judiciary did not receive any increased compensa-
tion. Sprecher, The Threat to Judicial Independence, 51 IND. L.J. 380, 383
(1976). A similar reluctance was manifested in September 1976, when Congress
voted to rescind the automatic cost-of-living increase it had voted the prior year
for itself, federal judges, and top-echelon federal employees. Wall St. J., Sept.
23, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
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The result of congressional failure to adjust judicial salaries
to keep pace with the inflationary spiral has been a substantial
diminution of the real income of the federal bench. This decline
has in turn produced periodic spates of resignations, unseemly ju-
dicial politicking, judicial demoralization, and the fostering of a
sense of economic dependence on Congress.9 Another result has
been the unprecedented lawsuit filed in the Court of Claims this
year by 140 federal judges seeking damages for the diminution in
their real incomes since March 15, 1969.10 The gravamen of the
judges' complaint is that the compensation clause prohibits the
executive and legislative branches from reducing, directly or
indirectly, the dollar amount of judicial salaries, and, further,
places a duty upon said branches to take such action as may
from time to time be necessary to prevent diminishment of
9 Ten federal judges have resigned in the past three years, primarily be-
cause of the six-year salary freeze between 1969 and 1975, a period of sharply
rising prices. Sprecher, supra note 8, at 383. Another 14 to 20 federal judges
are reported to be seriously considering resignation for economic reasons. Id.
at 383-84. Chief Justice Burger recently remarked that the federal bench has
had more resignations in the past year, based on economic grounds, thanat any time in the past one hundred years. I am also reliably informed
that many qualified lawyers have declined appointment because the pay
of a district judge is now only double the starting salary of law graduates
hired by large law offices.
Quoted in McGee, Are Judicial Salary Increases Coming?, 60 A.B.A.J. 1259,
1260 (1974). Reportedly, 15 lawyers recently declined a federal judgeship
in one area, while 13 declined in a second area. Sprecher, supra note 8, at
384. The problem is a recurrent one. Between 1940 and 1954, for example,
18 federal judges resigned, many because judicial salaries failed to keep pace
with the cost of living. Hearings on S. Doc. No. 104 Before the Comm. on Judi-
cial and Congressional Salaries, '83d 'Cong., 2d Sess. 451 (1954). For an indication
of the extent of judicial politicking involved in obtaining salary increases, see
Sprecher, supra note 8, at 383-86; Comment, Compensation of the Federal Judi-
ciary: A Reexamination, 8 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 594, 607-08 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Compensation].
10 Forty-four judges originally filed suit. Atkins v. United States, No. 41-76
(Ct. Cl., filed Feb. 12, 1976). After the filing of this suit, an additional 37
federal judges attempted to join with their colleagues as plaintiffs. Wall St. J.,
Mar. 26, 1,976, at 1, col. 3. However, since Court of Claims rules prevented
amendment of the complaint to include additional parties, a second complaint,
Bechtle v. United States, No. 132-76 (Ct. Cl., filed Mar. 25, 1976), was filed and
later consolidated with' the original suit. In the process, an additional judge
joined the plaintiffs. Fifty-eight judges have filed a third complaint which has
also been consolidated, Aldisert v. United States, No. 357-76 (Ct. Cl., filed Aug.
30, 1976), bringing the total number of judges to 140. The plaintiffs seek dam-
ages measured by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index from March
1969.
On May 27, 1976, the Court of Claims certified to the Supreme Court the
question whether its members were required to disqualify themselves under 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1970), since they have a financial interest in the outcome of the
suit. 44 U.S.L.W. 3706 (1976) (Docket No. 75-1728). On June 21, 1976, the
Supreme Court dismissed the certificate and returned the case to the Court of
Claims. 44 U.S.L.W. 3737 (1976).
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judicial compensation resulting from substantial reductions in
the value of money."
This Article will analyze the origin and the purpose of the
compensation clause in light of the issues raised by the current
lawsuit of the federal judges in the Court of Claims. The conclu-
sions will be drawn that the compensation clause proscribes any
reduction in the nominal value of judicial compensation, and that
although there is some evidence that the clause was intended to im-
pose an affirmative legal obligation upon Congress to maintain the
real economic value of judicial compensation, it is more properly
construed to impose only a moral duty upon Congress to increase
judicial compensation when certain circumstances arise. This
Article will next examine the circumstances viewed by the Framers
as necessitating an increase in judicial compensation. Finally, a
proposal will be made that Congress adopt a statutory formula for
automatically adjusting judicial salaries in a manner that will sub-
stantially discharge its heretofore neglected moral duty.
I. THE "ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING" AND THE
COMPENSATION CLAUSE
One of the complaints that the American colonists voiced
against the British Crown was the lack of judicial independence.
After 1761, colonial judges, in contrast to English judges, 2 served
at the pleasure of the King.'" From the colonists' perspective,
11 Complaint at 8, Atkins v. United States, No. 41-76 (Ct. Cl., filed
Feb. 12, 1976). As the language "from time to time" implies, the complain-
ants do not contend that Congress is obligated to increase their salaries each time
the Consumer Price Index increases. Rather, as more clearly stated by former
Justice Goldberg, their position is that the compensation clause imposes an obliga-
tion on Congress "to adjust nominal dollar salaries from time to time so that, over
a period of years, judges' actual salaries will not be significantly diminished."
Goldberg, Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 14
(emphasis added) (on file at the UCLA Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Gold-
berg, Brief].
The judges' contention that Congress has violated the compensation clause
rests on three interrelated arguments: (1) the failure of Congress to increase the
nominal salaries of federal judges in the face of substantial inflation; (2) the
Senate's passing of a resolution, S. Res. 293, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc.
S2900 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1974), which disapproved salary increases that would
otherwise have automatically taken effect under 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1970); and (3)
congressional discrimination by excepting judges from the general legislative
policy of maintaining the real value of the salaries of virtually all other federal
employees. Goldberg, Brief at 14.
12 The Act of Settlement of 1701, 12 & 13 Will c. 2, sec. II, provided for
the establishment and ascertainment of the salaries of English judges, who were
made responsible to Parliament instead of the King. See Ziskind, Judicial Tenure
In the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 SuP. Cr.
REv. 135, 137.
Is The same tenure had been granted the colonial judges down to 1761
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this dependence on royal pleasure decidedly impinged on the
quality of justice rendered in the colonial courts. 4 Reacting to
their distasteful experience with a dependent judiciary, the Fram-
ers of the Constitution insisted on the safeguarding of judicial in-
dependence. There was general agreement that both judicial ten-
ure and compensation should be immunized from legislative or ex-
ecutive interference for it was clearly perceived from the start of
the Framers' deliberations that the two were interdependent.'
The Framers' concern for judicial independence was mani-
fest in the original draft of the compensation clause, found in the
Randolph Resolutions (also known as the Virginia Plan). This
draft prohibited any increase or decrease in judicial salaries during
incumbency. Randolph's Ninth Resolution proposed that the fed-
eral judiciary would
receive punctually, at stated times[,] fixed compensation for
their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be
made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the
time of such increase or diminution. 6
By this clause, the judiciary was to be shielded from temptation
through salary increases and from retribution through salary
decreases.
The provision, originally accepted without discussion by the
when the King, acting upon the advice of the Board of Trade, altered
the commissions to a tenure during the royal pleasure on the ground thatthe state of learning in the colonies was so low that it was with difficulty
that men could be found competent to administer the judicial offices.
W. CARPENTER, JuDIcIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 2-3 ('1918).
14 Significantly, in listing the train of abuses committed by the British King,
the Declaration of Independence included:
He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure oftheir offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.
The "Declaration and Resolves" of the First Continental Congress in 1774lamented that "judges who before held only estates at will in their offices, havebeen made dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries." Quoted in
Fellman, The Diminution of Judicial Salaries, 24 IowA L. REv. 89, 90 (1938).On the general weakness of the colonial bench, see S. BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIARY 9-10 (1905).
15 As Justice Story observed: "Without this [compensation] provision theother, as to the tenure of office, would have been utterly nugatory, and indeed a
mere mockery." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 490 (1970).
16 1 M. FARRAwN, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
21-22 (1911). The Pinckney Plan was virtually identical on this point. Article
9 provided that "the Judges of these Courts shall hold their Offices during good
behavior & receive a compensation which shall not be increased or diminishedduring their continuance in office." Id. app. D, at 600. Hamilton's plan differed
slightly, providing that judges shall have "competent salaries to be paid at stated
times and not to be diminished during their continuance in office." Id. app. F,
at 626 (art. 5, § 1).
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Committee of the Whole, 7 was modified after a general debate
in the convention which emphasized the undesirability of fixing ju-
dicial salaries so inflexibly. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike
the words "or increase" on the ground that the "[legislature ought
to be at liberty to increase salaries as circumstances might require,
and that this would not create any improper dependence in the
Judges.""' Morris and his supporters envisaged two sets of cir-
cumstances which ought to require an increase in judicial salaries:
diminution in the value of judicial compensation due to inflation
and case load increases, and alterations in the state of society. The
first concern is reflected in the remarks of Benjamin Franklin, the
first person to speak in favor of Morris' amendment: "Money may
not only become plentier, but the business of the department may
increase as the Country becomes more populous."'19 Franklin's
comment suggests a concern for the need to protect judicial salaries
from inflation. This concern was hardly surprising: Runaway
inflation had resulted from the financing of the American Revolu-
tion with unbacked paper money.20 His desire to provide for
increased case loads appeared to stem from the perception that the
number of cases that graced the dockets of the federal courts dur-
ing the early years of the nation would probably increase very
substantially. 2'
The principal author of the Virginia Plan, James Madison,
did not deny the legitimacy of these concerns. Instead, Madison
argued that the harm in permitting any form of judicial depend-
ence on the legislature outweighed the potential benefits of Mor-
ris' proposed amendment. In his opinion, the contingencies of in-
flation and increased case loads could better be dealt with by in-
dexing judicial salaries and increasing the number of judges:
17 On May 30, 1787, the convention resolved itself into a Committee of the
Whole to discuss the Virginia Plan in detail. The compensation clause was
initially agreed upon June 5 without discussion. J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE
FEDERAL CONVNTION 109-10 (E. Scott ed. 1893). It was reported out intact by
the Committee of the Whole on June 13. Id. at 162.
18 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 44.
19 Id. at 44-45.
20 Within six years of issuance, this paper money, known as Continentals,
was being exchanged at the rate of $400 to $1,000 for one dollar in specie. In
accordance with a 1790 congressional act, Continentals were redeemable for one
cent on the dollar. A. HEPBURN, A HISTORY OF THE CURRENCY OF THE UNITED
STATES 13-19 (1903); G. WAJUEN & F. PEARSON, PRIcEs 328 (rev. ed. 1933).
Franklin was one of the early advocates of issuing paper currency. Id. at 327.
21 Other than admitting a few lawyers to practice before it, -the Supreme
Court had no business at all for the first three years of its existence. L. PFEFFER,
THIS HONORABLE COURT 43 (1965). By 1803, the Supreme Court had only 51
cases on its docket. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE Su-
PREME COURT 34-35 (1927). From the time of their establishment until the end
of 1801, the circuit courts heard a total of only 8,358 cases. Id. at 12-13.
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The dependence will be less if the increase alone should
be permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a
dependence. Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges,
or may be in agitation in the legislature, an undue complai-
sance in the former may be felt towards the latter .... The
variations in the value of money, may be guarded agst. by
taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent
value. The increase of business will be provided for by an
increase of the number who are to do it.2 2
Morris responded by denying the adequacy of Madison's
countermeasures and by indicating a second circumstance which
would require an increase in judicial salaries. In his view, a
change in the state of society might prevent a judge from main-
taining a station in life compatible with the dignity of the office:
The value of money may not only alter but the State of
Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of wheat,
the same value would not always be the same compensation.
The Amount of salaries must always be regulated by the man-
ners & the style of living in a Country. The increase of busi-
ness can not be provided for in the supreme tribunal in the
way that has been mentioned. All the business of a certain
description whether more or less must be done in that single
tribunal-Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide
for additional business. Additional compensation therefore
ought not to be prohibited. 28
Morris' motion to strike "or increase" carried by a vote of 6-2-1.24
The debate over the language of the compensation clause
reveals that the Framers were concerned that the real economic
value of judicial compensation might be diminished by inflation
22 2 M. FARAND, supra note 16, at 45.
28 Id.
24 Id. The Committee on Detail reworded the amended proposal to read:
The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the inferior courts, shall
hold their offices during good behavior. They shall, at stated times, re-
ceive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
J. MADISON, supra note 17, at 458.
Madison did not give up easily. On August 27, he and McHenry moved to
reinstate the prohibition against increasing judicial salaries. 2 M. FARRAND, supra
note 16, at 429. Gouverneur Morris reiterated his previous objections. This time
Madison was supported by Colonel Mason, who argued, somewhat illogically,
that there was nothing to the principal argument against Madison's motion-that
the value of money may change--"because this might be provided for by an
increase of salaries so made as not to affect persons in office. . . ." Id. General
Pinckney responded that he "did not think it would have a good effect or a good
appearance for new Judges to come in with higher salaries than the old ones."
id. at 430. Furthermore, Morris suggested that Mason's expedient could easily
be avoided by having incumbent judges resign and reappointing them at higher
salaries. Id. Madison's motion was defeated by a vote of 5-1, with four absent
and one vote divided. Madison, joined by Randolph, responded to this vote with
a last-ditch motion to prevent any legislation raising judicial salaries from taking
effect until three years after its enactment. This motion was also defeated. J.
MADISoN, supra note 17, at 616.
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and/or increased work loads, or that societal changes might
render judicial salaries inadequate to maintain a suitable station in
life. They were apprehensive that such eventualities, if uncor-
rected, might ultimately undermine the constitutional guaranty of
judicial independence, and were agreed on the need for a safe-
guard. They disagreed, however, as to the means for guarding
against these contingencies. Madison and his supporters feared
the result of entrusting Congress with the power to adjust the sal-
aries of incumbent judges. Thus, Madison proposed that inflation
instead be dealt with by an indexing device-tying judicial salaries
to the price of wheat, or some other stable value. Rejection
of Madison's indexing plan probably reflected more an objection
to the crudity of the indexing technique proposed rather than op-
position to the principle of indexing. Indeed, Morris' counterpro-
posal reflects at least in part a concern that the value of wheat
might not be very permanent, or that it might not fluctuate in the
same direction as expenditures of judges. Given the nonexistence
of sophisticated cost-of-living adjustment techniques, it is not sur-
prising that a majority of the Framers deemed entrusting Congress
with some power over judicial salaries the more practicable solu-
tion to the contingency of inflation.
The Framers plainly intended that Congress' power to in-
crease judicial compensation be exercised to respond to an in-
creased volume of cases. This reflected the Framers' belief that
those who perform more work should receive greater pay.25
Though Madison would have preferred to meet this concern by
adding more judges, he had no answer to Morris' argument that
there was a practical limitation to adding justices to the Supreme
Court. In fact, once Morris' proposal had been adopted, Madison
credited the need to increase judicial salaries as case loads in-
creased as having the greatest role in securing acceptance of the
Morris amendment. In a passage indicating acquiescence in the
case load argument, Madison conceded:
25 This belief was evidenced on a state court level in the action of the mem-
bers of the Virginia Court of Appeals in 1788, when they sent a vehement letter
to the state legislature protesting the proposed imposition of additional case loads
on the courts without a concomitant increase in compensation. The letter stated
in part:
But the act now under consideration presenting a system, which assigns,
to the judges of the chancery and admiralty, jurisdiction in common law
cases: which so far may be considered as a new office, the labour of
which would greatly exceed that of the former: without a correspondent
reward; and to the judges of the general court, duties, which, though not
changed as to their subjects, are yet more than doubled, without any
increase of salary, appeared so evident an attack upon the independency
of the judges, that they thought it inconsistent with a conscientious dis-
charge of their duty to pass it over.
Letter from the Judges of the Virginia Circuit Court of Appeals to the Virginia
State Legislature, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 145 (1788).
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I wished myself, to insert a restraint on the augmentation
as well as the diminution of their compensation. . . .But I
was over-ruled. I must state the reasons which were urged.-
They had great weight.-The business must increase. If there
was no power to increase their pay, according to the increase
of business, during the life of the judges, it might happen, that
there would be such an accumulation of business, as would
reduce the pay to a most trivial consideration.
26
The second contingency that motivated the Framers was an
alteration in the state of society rendering judicial salaries inade-
quate. Their vision of the role of the judiciary required attract-
ing the finest legal talent to the federal bench, which meant
paying salaries compatible with the dignity and exigencies of the
office. Thus, in opposing Madison's motion to reinstate his origi-
nal version of the compensation clause, General Pinckney re-
marked: "The importance of the Judiciary will require men of the
first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than
the U.S. can allow in the first instance."" A large part of Morris'
objection to Madison's indexing proposal was that merely main-
taining the real value of judicial salaries was not enough. If
changes in the style of living in the country made it difficult to at-
tract and hold first-rate legal talent on the federal bench, Congress
should be able to raise judicial salaries.
The debate on the compensation clause thus focused spe-
cifically on averting potential declines in the real economic value
of judicial salaries due to inflation and increased work loads, and
on ensuring federal judges an income commensurate with the of-
fice. The result of these concerns was a compromise of the prin-
ciple of judicial independence: Congress was given the discre-
tionary power to raise judicial salaries as circumstances might re-
quire, but was denied the authority to reduce the compensation of
a judge during his or her term of office.
This impression is confirmed by Hamilton's comments in
Federalist No. 79, the most complete exposition of the compensa-
tion clause:
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision
for their support .... In the general course of human nature,
a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the
complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power,
in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuni-
ary resources on the occasional grants of the latter .... The
plan of the convention accordingly has provided that the
26 3 M. FARuRAND, supra note 16, at 332.
27 2 Id. at 429.
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judges of the United States "shall at stated times receive for
their services a compensation which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office."
This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible
provision that could have been devised. It will readily be un-
derstood that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the
state of society rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the
Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-
day, might in half a century become penurious and inade-
quate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion
of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the
variations in circumstances, yet under such restrictions as to
put it out of the power of that body to change the condition
of the individual for the worse. A man may then be sure
of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be de-
terred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in
a less eligible situation. The clause which has been quoted
combines both advantages. The salaries of judicial officers
may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require,
yet so as never to lessen the allowance with which any particu-
lar judge comes into office, in respect to him.
2 8
A grant of power to raise salaries from time to time, however,
does not mean that failure to exercise such power violates the
Constitution. A constitutional grant of power to Congress nor-
mally imposes no concomitant obligation to exercise such power.
Indeed, the power granted to the legislature was one to be exer-
cised in its "discretion," as circumstances might require. In light
of the discretionary nature of the power conferred upon Congress,
it makes more sense to construe the compensation clause as im-
posing a moral, rather than a legal, duty upon Congress to
maintain the real economic value of judicial salaries.
2 9 Under the
28 THE FEDERAuSr No. 79, 497-98 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)
(emphasis added).
29 Whether the compensation clause protects the real economic value of
judicial salaries had never been squarely presented to the courts prior to Atkins
v. United States, No. 41-76 (Ct. Cl., filed Feb. 12, 1976). The few precedents
interpreting the clause have viewed it as protecting only the nominal value of
judicial salaries, without discussing the real value issue. These cases occurred in
the Great Depression of the 1930's, when two attempts by Congress to reduce
judicial salaries produced challenges in the courts. In 1932, Congress reduced the
salaries and pensions of all federal judges earning in excess of $10,000 per year,
but warily exempted those judges "whose compensation may not, under the Con-
stitution, be diminished during their continuance in office," in an attempt to avoid
litigation. Legislative Appropriations Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, §§ 106,
107(a)(5), 47 Stat. 3,82, 401-02. A subsequent attempt by the Comptroller
General, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), to reduce the
salaries of the judges of the courts of the District of Columbia was held to be a
misapplication of this statute on the ground that the District of Columbia courts
were among those whose judges' salaries could not be diminished under the Con-
stitution. In O'Donoghue, the Court was able to avoid the constitutional question
presented by salary reductions by finding that the judicial offices in question were
among those Congress had excepted. However, the following year, when Congress
317
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construction here urged, Congress has complete discretion in dis-
charging its duty to maintain the real economic value of judicial
compensation, but remains morally obligated to discharge that
duty when the specific circumstances envisioned by the Framers
occur.
The extent to which Congress has complied with the moral
obligation imposed by the compensation clause has varied. Gen-
erally, Congress has deserved reasonably high marks for compli-
ance. At certain times, however, particularly in the last few years,
Congress has sadly neglected its moral responsibility to the federal
judiciary.
II. THE DECLINE IN REAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF JUDICIAL
COMPENSATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The nominal salaries of the federal judiciary have increased
substantially over the past 186 years.80 Congress has raised the
ordered a 15 percent reduction in the pensions of retired judges of article IIIcourts, Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1934, ch. 101, § 13, 48 Stat.283, 307, the constitutional issue of reducing judicial salaries was before the Court.In Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934), the Supreme Court held thatsuch a reduction violated the compensation clause. Since the cost of living hadfallen by more than 22 percent between 1930 and 1933, the government mighthave argued, but did not, that the statute did not violate the compensation clause
because the real economic value of the pensions of the retired judges had actuallyincreased despite the nominal reduction. The government also failed to argue
that since Judge Booth's pension, even after the statutory reduction, was still twiceas great as his salary when he first assumed office, there had been no violation ofthe compensation clause. Noting that the Solicitor General had with "commend-
able candor" admitted the point, the Court went on to make it clear that the com-pensation clause has a ratchet-type effect that precludes reductions at any point.Once a judge receives an increase in salary, his initial salary is irrelevant in terms
of assessing whether a reduction in his salary has occurred. Thus, the Courtplainly regarded the compensation clause as protecting the nominal value ofjudicial salaries, and its opinion can be read as an implicit rejection of the con-
stitutional relevance of the real economic value of judicial salaries.
There were numerous attempts by state legislatures during the Great Depres-sion to reduce the salaries of state court judges. A substantial number of these
statutes were invalidated in the state courts on the basis that they contravenedstate constitutional analogues to the compensation clause. See, e.g., Freeney v.Brown, 182 Ga. 818, 187 S.E. 40 (1936); Olive Hill v. Craig, 267 Ky. 38, 101S.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1937); Rathbun v. Board of Supervisors, 275 Mich. 479,267 N.W. 543 (1936); Gillespie v. Board of County Auditors, 267 Mich. 483, 255
N.W. 388 (1934); In re Summers, 149 Misc. 27, 266 N.Y. Supp. 618 (Sup. Ct.1933); Hueck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933).See also Note, Legislative Reduction of Judicial Compensation During the Depres-sion, 43 YALE L.J. 1175 (1934). Though the argument that such analogues pro-tect only the real value of judicial compensation does not appear to have beenurged before any of these courts, these decisions can be interpreted as further sup-port for the proposition that courts have traditionally considered only the nominalvalue of judicial compensation in determining whether a compensation clause
violation has occurred.
80 See Appendix, Table I infra.
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Supreme Court Justices' salaries twelve times, so that the $3,500
initial salary has increased eighteenfold to $63,000. 81 Congress
has augmented the salaries of the circuit judges nine times, boost-
ing their 1869 salaries of $5,000 almost ninefold to $44,625.2
The salaries of the district judges, originally set between $800
and $1,800, have also been raised nine times and are now a uni-
form $42,000.8
Simply comparing the nominal salaries paid to federal judges
over a 186-year period, however, is not meaningful for several
reasons. First, inflation has so deteriorated our currency's purchas-
ing power that a comparison of eighteenth century and twentieth
century dollars is equivalent to comparing dollars and francs with-
out regard to exchange rates.8 4 Second, case loads have increased
dramatically."5 Third, there have been substantial changes in re-
tirement pay and fringe benefits since the establishment of the
federal judiciary. 6
A. Currency Depreciation
Inflation has so substantially eroded the real economic value
of the dollar since 1789 that consideration of only the increase in
nominal salaries can be very misleading. Table I of the Appen-
dix, which does not take inflation into account, shows that nominal
judicial salaries have steadily increased since 1789. Although
there is no precise method to measure inflation, the wholesale or
consumer price indices, which are the most commonly used yard-
sticks, generally provide a satisfactory approximation. 7 Reliable
consumer price indices for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries




84 The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes an index of the purchasing
power of the consumer dollar. The index, utilizing data contained in the Consumer
Price Index and based upon 1967 = $1, shows that between 1913 and 1972, the
dollar's buying power declined from $3.367 to $.799. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 287 (1973). By
December 1974, the dollar's buying power had fallen to $.644. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 316 (1975).
35 See Appendix, Table VIII infra.
86 See notes 71-79 & accompanying text infra.
87 The Wholesale Price Index (WPI) measures changes over time in the
wholesale prices paid for a selected list of products. It is designed to measure
changes in the prices at the level of their first important commercial transaction.
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures changes over time in the prices of
equivalent goods and services consumed during the normal course of living. In
most countries it is the most widely used estimate of the inflation rate. See
generally W. WALLACE, MEAsURING PRICE CHANGEs: A STUDY OF THE PRICE
INDEXES (2d ed. 1972).
88 There are a number of cost-of-living indices for the 19th century. U.S.
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ponents derived from reasonably comprehensive wholesale price in-
dices, tracks real economic value of judicial compensation for Asso-
ciate Justices between 1789 and 1911, by restating changes in the
nominal value of their salaries in terms of 1789 dollars. As Table
II demonstrates, though judicial salaries have generally increased in
real terms since 1789, there have been several periods during
which the purchasing power of judicial salaries declined so
much that even when Congress later voted increases, those raises
were insufficient to restore prior real salary levels.89
Table III of the Appendix shows that between 1789 and
1819, when Congress first raised the salaries of the members of
the Supreme Court, the purchasing power of the original salary of
the office had fallen quite sharply. 40 Congressional niggardliness
during this early period nearly cost the country the services of one
of the Supreme Court's most illustrious members, Joseph Story.
Reluctant even to accept an appointment to the court in 1811 be-
cause of the inadequacy of the $3,500 salary,41 Story was later
sorely tempted to resign after Congress failed to increase salaries
to offset the sharp increase in prices caused by the War of 1812.42
In 1816, Story lobbied heavily for an increase in salaries, citing the
100 to 200 percent increase in living expenses since 1789 and the
fourfold increase in the business of the Court.43
A similar experience occurred between 1864 and 1869. The
Civil War virtually doubled the general price level, but the salaries
of the Supreme Court Justices, which had been set at $6,000
in 1855, actually fell below the original value of the office in
real terms during this period. Despite the more than seventy
percent increase in their nominal salaries, Supreme Court Justices
in 1864 were in real terms earning only about three-fourths of
what a Supreme Court Justice had been paid in 1789. On the
other hand, Table III also reveals that a judge fortunate enough
to be appointed at the beginning of a period of generally declining
price levels, such as the period 1874-1911, realized very substan-
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 127 (1960). However, the number
of items upon which they are based is so small as to cast considerable doubt on
their reliability. For a summary of the bases of these indices, see id. at 110-11.
39 Note especially the decline in purchasing power in 1814, 1839, 1854, and
1864. Appendix, Table III infra.
40 In only one year during this period, 1791, when the index number was
85, did the Wholesale Price Index fall below the 1789 level. G. WARREN & F.
PEARSON, supra note 20, at 25.
41 G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SuPREMn COURT
151 (1970).
42 Id.
43 Commentary by Story on his Proposed Judiciary Bill, in 1 W. STORY,
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 301-02 (1851).
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tial increases in his real income although his nominal income re-
mained constant.
The economic effects of price level changes during the twen-
tieth century can be vividly demonstrated from Tables I-VII of
the Appendix.44 Though by no means ideal for calculating
changes in the real value of judicial compensation, 5 the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index utilized in these ta-
bles permits more meaningful estimates of the variations in the
real income of the federal judiciary than the wholesale price data
available for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Table IV
of the Appendix shows that the real salary of Supreme Court Jus-
tices declined by thirteen percent between 1910 and 1975, while
the real salary of circuit and district judges increased by ten and
twenty percent, respectively.
Breaking down this sixty-five-year period into smaller intervals,
it is apparent that Congress permitted the real salaries of some
judges to decline severely, while others' salaries appreciated quite
substantially. Table V of the Appendix shows the effect of inflation
on judicial salaries from 1911 to 1926, a period in which the Con-
sumer Price Index more than doubled. Had judicial salaries been
indexed to the Consumer Price Index during this period, a Su-
preme Court Justice who served throughout the entire period
would have earned an additional $123,664.29. The average an-
nual salary loss to a hypothetical Justice during this period was
$8,244.29, or 56.8 percent of his annual salary. A circuit judge
or district judge serving through this period would have lost
$49,200 and $40,671, respectively, to inflation. That their losses
are smaller than the Justices is attributable primarily to their
smaller salaries, and secondarily to their receipt of a $1,500 raise
in 1919. However, the $1,500 raise fell far sbort of restoring pur-
chasing power lost during the sixteen-year interval since their last
44 All of these tables utilize a weighted consumer price index compiled
since 1911 by the United States Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics.
45 One basic difficulty with using the Consumer Price Index for this
purpose is that the index is based upon the expenditure patterns of urban wage
earners and clerical workers. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 10 (reference ed. 1975). Federal judges have
much larger incomes than the families surveyed; their expenditure patterns are
therefore somewhat different. Further, since the weights assigned to the various
items which make up the market-basket measured by the index reflect the
expenditures of lower income families, the index is to a certain extent misweighted
for federal judges.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has conducted a pilot study with a consumer
price index based upon the expenditure patterns of a much larger segment of the
United States population. Data from the last 13 years suggest that the expanded
index would have registered a somewhat lower rate of inflation than the existing
index. Duscha, Overhauling the C.P..-Price Index to Provide Dual View of
Inflation, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1974, § 3, at 1, cols. 5-8, and 8, cols. 6-8.
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raise.46 Similarly, when Congress finally raised the Supreme
Court's salaries in 1926, the $8,000 increase was almost $5,000
less than that required to restore the purchasing power of the
$14,500 salary the Justices had been earning in 1911. No at-
tempt was made to compensate the Justices for sums shorn from
their real income by inflation.
Failure to index judicial salaries also helped certain members
of the federal judiciary in the period between 1926 and 1946, dur-
ing which nominal salaries remained constant. The Consumer
Price Index fell 26.8 percent between 1926 and 1933, and did not
reach its 1926 level again until 1944. This meant that a judge ap-
pointed in 1926 experienced a 26.8 percent increase in his real
salary in 1933. However, a judge appointed in 1933 experienced
a 26.8 percent decrease in his real salary by 1944.
Tables VI and VII of the Appendix show the substantial
losses in judicial real income resulting from inflation in the periods
1946-1955 and 1969-1975. Failure to index between 1946 and
1955 meant a cumulative loss of earnings of $65,854 to an Associ-
,ate Justice who served during the entire period, and cumulative
losses to similarly situated circuit and district judges of $46,099
and $39,513, respectively. Failure to index between 1969 and
1975 resulted in a cumulative loss of earnings of $79,836 to an
Associate Justice, $56,550 to a circuit judge, and $53,124 to a dis-
trict judge.
In practical terms, substantial declines in real income are far
more significant than what has happened to judicial compensation
over a fifty- or sixty-year period. For federal judges, whose average
age is sixty-three, 47 it is the short run that matters. Lawyers who de-
cide to accept judicial appointments generally recognize that some
economic sacrifice is involved; however, calculations as to the ex-
tent of sacrifice involved are typically based upon the assumption
that their initial real salaries as judges will not be permitted to
decline drastically.
Prior to World War II, the effect of price level changes on ju-
dicial compensation was unpredictable. During the eighteenth, nine-
teenth and first part of the twentieth centuries, the general price
level fluctuated such that an inflation-induced decline in real salary
could be followed by a period of deflation, resulting in an opportu-
46 In order to restore the real income of circuit judges to 1903 levels, their
1919 salaries should have been set at $16,252 instead of $8,500. Correspondingly,
the salaries of district judges should have been set at $13,931 instead of $7,500.
These calculations are based upon the index numbers found in Table II infra.
47 Sprecher, supra note 8, at 391.
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nity to recoup real income previously lost. Of course, the timing of
judicial appointments did not always correspond with these eco-
nomic swings. Some judges were severely hurt by inflation; others
had their incomes greatly enhanced by deflation. Whether one was
a victim or a beneficiary depended simply on the fortuity of the
timing of one's judicial appointment.
Since 1939, however, prices in this country have risen stead-
ily, even during periods of recession. 48  This unparalleled sus-
tained increase in prices is not simply an American phenomenon;
consumer prices have been rising steadily in almost all countries
since World War II There are at least six reasons why this steady
rise in prices is likely to continue during the reasonably foresee-
able future: (1) the oil cartel and its imitators,50 (2) the sanctity
of full employment,5' (3) the increase in administered prices and
48 The Consumer Price Index fell only in 1949, when it declined seven-
tenths of a point, and in 1955, when it declined three-tenths of a point. Appendix,
Table VI infra.
49 See Meiselman, Worldwide Inflation: A Monetarist View, in THE PHE-
NOMENON OF WORLDWmE INFLATION 69 (D. Meiselman & A. Laffer eds. 1975).
50 The single most important factor in accounting for the sharp boost in
global inflation rates during 1973-74 was the energy crisis provoked by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a cartel formed by the oil
producing nations. Dale, Inflation That Wasn't Bred at Home, N.Y. Times, May
2, 1976, § 3, at 2, cols. 4-8. In this period, OPEC quadrupled the price of oil.
Id. Despite internal dissension and price-shaving by a few countries, OPEC has
managed to hold together as a cartel. F. CAIRNCROSS & H. McRAE, THE SECOND
GREAT CRASH 45 (1975). The message has not been lost upon producers of pri-
mary products; these countries have attempted to form cartels to boost the prices
of commodities such as bananas, copper, coffee, phosphate, bauxite and iron ore.
Id. at 117-18; B. GRIFFITHS, INFLATION: THE PRICE OF PROSPERITY 172-73
(1976). The developing trend towards cartelization forebodes sharply increasing
prices for much of the world.
If these were one-shot price increases, they could be absorbed into the price
structure and cease to be a source of future inflationary pressures. Tobin, There
are Three Types of Inflation: We Have Two, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1974, § 1, at 33,
cols. 1-4. But many of the OPEC nations have demanded that oil prices be con-
tinually increased, at least to compensate for the loss in purchasing power in the
currencies with which they are paid for their oil exports. If they are successful
in pressing these demands, a price spiral is likely to follow. OPEC could then
become a source of continuous world-wide inflationary pressure. See Statement
of Charles Robinson, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Before the
Subcommittee on International Finance and Resources of the Senate Finance
Committee, Jan. 26, 1976. Dep't of State News Release, Jan. 26, 1976 (on file
at the UCLA Law Review).
51 The lesson taught by the Great Depression, World War II, and Lord
Keynes--that massive governmental spending can put the unemployed back to
work-has become an accepted part of the common wisdom. G. BACH, THE
NEW INFLATION 40 (1973); B. GRIFFITHS, supra note 50, at 4-5. Even though it
is also recognized that there is no more potent inflationary fuel than large govern-
mental deficits, if financed by the expansion of money and credit, few political
leaders can resist demands for increased governmental spending when the jobless
rate rises much beyond a level historically deemed critical. Most people would
prefer to trade moderate inflation for low unemployment. Whether there is such
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wages,5 2 (4) the increase in governmental assumption of welfare
costs, 5s (5) the abandonment of the gold standard,5' and (6) the
a tradeoff is not nearly as important as the fact that most people believe such a
tradeoff exists. See D. LAIDLER, ESSAYS ON MONEY AND INFLATION 96-97 (1975);
B. Griffiths, supra note 50, at 78-93. Until recently, it was fashionable in many
economic circles to refer to this tradeoff in terms of a downward sloping curve
named after Professor A. W. Phillips, who was the first to attempt to quantify
the tradeoff. The "stagflation" experienced by many countries during the 1970's,
with its combination of high unemployment and high inflation, cast considerable
doubt upon the utility of the Phillips curve analysis. See P. SAMUELSON, Eco-
NOMICS 831-36 (9th ed. 1973).
52 The strength of labor unions has been increasing substantially in most
countries since the depression of the 1930's. Union organization has spread far
beyond the blue collar ranks to include groups such as teachers, public employees,
and health care workers. Unionization has generated a strong upward pressure
on wages, which are a major cost component in modem economies. G. BACH,
supra note 51, at 42. Moreover, wage behavior is increasingly rachet-like; wages
go up, but in most industries they do not go down, despite recession and weak
demand.
Concomitantly, some industries are dominated by a few large corporations
with sufficient market power to raise prices without fear of losing customers to
competition. Rather than risk interruption of production with a strike, it is
easier for such corporations to accede to union demands for substantial wage
increases. These increases are then passed on to the public. The point is more
fully developed in J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 186-94
(1973).
Also important is the discovery by organized economic groups that what the
market will not deliver, the legislature sometimes will. Examples of industries or
other pressure groups receiving subsidies in the form of price supports or tariff
protection from legislatures are legion. Legislatures everywhere have been in-
creasingly willing to intervene in the marketplace to help out groups which used
to regard themselves as at the mercy of inexorable market forces. See G. BACH,
supra note 5.1, at 40-45.
53 Since the Great Depression, governments in most countries have under-
taken vast social welfare programs. There have been huge increases in govern-
mental spending for those members of the population who are poor, handicapped,
or infirm. Not only have the classes of persons entitled to governmental benefits
widened, but benefit levels have also increased substantially. Welfare and social
security beneficiaries have also begun to organize and lobby for greater increases
in benefits. There is every reason to believe that in most democratic nations social
welfare costs will continue the pattern of substantial increases. G. BACH, supra
note 51, at 43-44.
54 With all of its defects, and there were many, the gold standard had a
decided tendency to check deficit spending and monetary expansion. See B.
GRIFFITHS, supra note 50, at 137; 2 J. KEYNES, TREATISE ON MONEY 299 (1950).
The limited amount of gold available to back domestic currency or to cover bal-
ance of payments deficits serves as a natural brake on inflationary spending pro-
grams. With the demise of the gold standard in the 1930's, this constraint largely
disappeared. See R. HAwTREY, THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
142-83 (5th ed. 1947). Though international transactions were linked to gold
under the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 which set up the International
Monetary Fund, the United States dollar was a "reserve currency" and in practice
the dollar became the usual means of payment for international transfers. S.
ROLFE, GOLD AND WORLD PowER 78-82 (1966). During the post-World War II
era the United States economy was extremely strong, especially in comparison with
the war-battered economies of Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. There was
enormous confidence in the dollar, which was almost everywhere regarded as
good as gold. But the situation gradually changed, as the vast balance of pay-
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creation of inflationary expectations. 55 These reasons for the exist-
ence of chronic inflationary pressures in most free world econo-
mies, and the United States in particular, do not imply the lack of
countervailing pressures. 6 But the total elimination of inflation is
unlikely to be a politically viable strategy for democratic nations.
In light of the great likelihood that the movement of the general
price level in itself will not provide a vehicle for recoupment of in-
come eroded by inflation, it is necessary for Congress to take ac-
tion to ensure that judicial salaries retain their real value.
B. The Case Load Avalanche
Inflation is not the only blade that has pared the real income
of the federal judiciary. The striking increase in case loads has
also whittled away at the real rate of judicial compensation. The
number of cases disposed of by the Supreme Court has increased
more than tenfold between 1910 and 1975. During the same per-
ments surplus of the United States dwindled. By 1971, -the gold liabilities of the
United States were more than four times as great as its gold reserves. B. G~ir-
wrrs, supra note 50, at 133. The response of the United States was to torpedo
the Bretton Woods agreement in August 1971 by refusing to redeem dollars held
abroad for gold. Id. at 123, 134. Gold has now become demonetarized, and
exchange rates are more or less free to float. By the end of 1974 there were an
estimated $143 billion Eurodollars outstanding, making the Eurocurrency system
the second largest banking system in the world. Many economists claim that the
vast increase in Eurodollars (740 percent between 1966 and 1974) has been itself
an important cause of current world inflation. Whether this contention is true
remains to be seen. Kerekes, Eurocurrency: Inflationary Giant?, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 26, 1975, § 3, at 18, cols. 1-4.
55 Once inflation has become chronic, people develop an inflationary psy-
chology. Economic decisions come to include calculations for anticipated infla-
tion. Wage demands are higher than they would otherwise be because workers
expect prices to go up during the course of the contract. Rents are set at higher
levels than they would be during economic stability to try to ensure an adequate
real return on investment. Budgeting calculations factor in the anticipated infla-
tion rate. People reduce their holdings of cash and other unprotected financial
assets to a minimum and bid up the price of assets which are commonly regarded
as inflation-proof, such as real estate. Interest rates rise, and the definition of
"long-term" credit commitments becomes shorter and shorter. This inflationary
psychology soon becomes an autonomous cause of inflation. See H. Giersch,
Index Clauses and the Fight Against Inflation, in EssAYs oN INFLAION AND IN-
DEXATON 12 (1974). If all other sources of inflationary pressures could be
suddenly eliminated, prices would continue to rise, at least for some time, simply
because people expected prices to rise. More than 35 years of virtually continuous
inflation have created inflationary expectations in all but the most unsophisticated.
56 Competition, where it exists, makes most businesses hesitant to raise
prices. Certain prices within an economy have been more or less controlled.
Citizens do resist steadily increasing tax rates and demand constraints upon gov-
ernmental spending. Most people still regard inflation as an evil, even though
they may be profiting from it in some respects, and will oppose political groups
that seek blatantly inflationary policies and programs. G. BACH, supra note 51,
at 47-52. And despite the development of an inflationary psychology, the
nominalist illusion still persists. People tend to regard a dollar as a dollar, re-
gardless of when earned or spent.
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iod, the number of cases decided per circuit court judge multi-
plied nearly fourfold, while the number of cases decided per dis-
trict court judge increased by only about fifteen percent.1
7
An increase in the "business of the court" is reflected not
only in the total number of cases decided, but also by the nature
of cases decided. The complexity of Supreme Court cases has in-
creased enormously since the turn of the century, when many of
the cases involved relatively straightforward issues of common
law. Today many of the Court's decisions deal with weighty ques-
tions of constitutional and statutory interpretation.58 Moreover,
the process of deciding what not to decide is itself time consum-
ing, 5 and is, in many ways, as important as what the court actually
decides.60 Similarly, the complexity of the litigation in the circuit
and district courts has been increasing. In the late 1940's and
early 1950's, the number of protracted cases started to increase no-
ticeably."' Many of these took several months to try, and one rec-
ord on appeal extended to more than 70,000 pages.62 In addi-
tion, in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education63 and Baker v.
Carr," the lower federal courts were thrust into the time-consum-
ing business of overseeing school desegregation and legislative re-
apportionment. Complex cases which show up in the statistics as
single cases may well consume the better part of a judge's time
during an entire year. Between 1969 and 1975, the number of
cases taking more than twice as long as the ordinary case filed in
federal court increased by more than 300 percent.65
57 Appendix, Table VIII infra.
58 F. FRAN'KFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 307, concluded that by
1925 the Supreme Court had ceased to be a "common law court." Casper and
Posner found that by 1971 to 1972 almost 60 percent of the cases on the Supreme
Court's appellate docket involved constitutional issues. Casper & Posner, A
Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 339, 350 (1974). In
the 1957-1958 term, only 642 out of the 1,746 cases on the Court's appellate
docket involved constitutional issues. By the 1971-1972 term, 2,015 out of the
3,474 cases on the appellate docket raised constitutional issues. Id. at 351.
59 Casper and Posner estimate that the number of hours required by each
Justice to screen applications for review has increased from 5.4 hours per week in
1957 to 1958, to 11.8 hours in 1971 to 1972. Casper & Posner, supra note 58,
at 363.
60 See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962).
61 Hearings on Crisis in the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Crisis in the Courts].
62 Id. at 32-33.
63 347 U.S. 483 (1954), implemented in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
64 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
65 A CASE FOR AN IMMEDIATE SALARY INCREASE FOR FEDERAL JUDGES, A
STUDY PREPARED FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIAL COM-
PENSATION 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A CASE FPOR AN IMMEDIATE SALARY
INCREASE].
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The statistics are misleading in other ways. They do not re-
flect how much judicial output takes the form of ruling on motions,
nor do they reflect the time spent on administration, three-judge
district courts or en banc cases. All of these factors, if taken into
account, would render the case load increase even more acute.
Still another factor which does not show up in the statistics, al-
though cutting in the opposite direction, is the assistance of law
clerks. Congress first authorized a single clerk for each Supreme
Court Justice in 1886.66 Circuit judges did not receive a law clerk
until 1930, and district judges did not receive a similar authoriza-
tion until 1936. 67 Today each Justice has three law clerks, while
circuit and district judges each have two. 68  It is difficult to assess
the effect of the increase in the number of law clerks on judicial
productivity, because individual judges utilize their law clerks dif-
ferently. Some judges entrust their law clerks with important
tasks such as drafting opinions or bench memoranda, or screening
petitions for certiorari. Others use their law clerks primarily as
sounding boards for ideas or as citation checkers.69 At least part
of the increase in judicial productivity is doubtless attributable to
the increased assistance of law clerks.7
C. Fringe Benefits
Comparing the real economic value of judicial compensation
over time is complicated by changes in the non-salary aspects of
judicial employment, all of which have been added since 1869.
Chief among these are retirement, disability, and death benefits.
In addition, federal judges, like other government employees, re-
ceive group life insurance and hospitalization benefits.71 Retire-
06 Act of Aug. 4, 1886, ch. 902, 24 Stat. 254.
67 Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1125,
1131 n.24 (1973).
68 Id. The Chief Justice and the chief judges each have an additional law
clerk.
69 Id. at 1129-33.
70 See, e.g., Crisis in the Courts, supra note 61, at 55, 57, 65, 80-81.
71 Group life insurance benefits were first granted the federal judiciary in
1954. See Act of Aug. .17, 1954, ch. 598, § 2(a), 68 Stat. 7'36. The amount of
insurance was limited to the lesser of the judge's annual salary or $20,000, and
the government's contribution to the premium was limited to one-half of the
employee's contribution, or a maximum of $10 per month. The government now
pays one-half the premium for a policy whose face value is roughly equal to a
judge's annual salary; the government's contribution currently amounts to $34.61
per month for a district judge and $36.14 per month for a circuit judge. Tele-
phone interview with Ms. Patricia Carrol, Chief of Physical Operations Branch,
Administrative Office of the Courts, June 8, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Carrol
Interview].
Hospitalization insurance benefits were first granted the federal judiciary pur-
suant to Act of Sept. 24, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-382, 73 Stat. 708. Judges
may elect a great variety of plans with 30 different carriers, which makes it
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ment and disability benefits are extraordinarily generous, largely
because the Constitution bestows life tenure upon article III judges.
To induce infirm and/or superannuated judges to retire, Congress
has been forced to eliminate virtually all of the economic incen-
tives for remaining on active status.12  Federal judges have been
permitted to retire at full salary at seventy with ten years of service
since 1869.78 The law was amended in 1954 to permit those
judges with fifteen years of service to retire at full salary at
sixty-five.74 And since 1939, disabled judges with ten years of serv-
ice have been permitted to retire at full salary; disabled judges with
fewer than ten years of service receive half salary."5
Death benefits, in sharp contrast, are relatively penurious.
They are also relatively recent, dating back only to 1954 for Su-
preme Court Justices 76 and to 1956 for the lower court judges.17
Judges who elect to deposit three percent of their salaries each
difficult to assign a specific value to hospitalization benefits. In 1959, the gov-
ernment's contribution was limited to a maximum of $8.50 per month for family
plan; the government's contribution now goes as high as $50.11 per judge. Carrol
Interview, supra.
Another fringe benefit that should be mentioned, despite an absence of data,
is vacation time. The length of vacations varies from court to court and from
judge to judge. Some judges take a month's vacation; some take no vacation;
still others take working vacations. Further, vacations are sometimes interrupted
for emergency motions or sittings. In the initial terms of the Supreme Court,
there was so little business that the Justices might realistically have been regarded
as on perpetual vacations. The burden of the Court's business is now so great
that most Justices find themselves with little uninterrupted vacation time. See
Powell, Myths and Misconceptions about the Supreme Court, 61 A.B.A.J. 1344,
1345 (1975). For a listing of the fringe benefits paid to federal and state judges,
see Chapin, Current Compensation Provisions, 58 JUDICATURE 168-94 (1974).
72 A primary motivation for passage of the first statute permitting federal
judges to retire with full salary was to make it economically feasible for two
infirm Supreme Court Justices, Grier and Nelson, to retire. Fairman, The Retire-
ment of Federal Judges, 51 Hv. L. REv. 397, 416 (1938).
78 Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 45.
74 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1970).
75 Id. § 372(a).
78 Id. § 375. Until 1954, Congress made no provision for the surviving
spouses of Supreme Court Justices. Following the death of former Chief Jus-
tice Vinson, who died leaving a net estate of only $1,163, Congress author-
ized payment of the same annuity it had authorized for President Coolidge's
widow in 1937, $5,000. Though Congress twice increased that amount for widows
of former presidents, it did not do so for widows of Supreme Court Justices. Not
until 1972, following press reports about the dire straits of some of these widows
trying to survive on a pension geared to 1937, did Congress increase the annuity
to $10,000 for six surviving widows. Retired and sitting Justices were offered the
option of participating in the judicial survivors annuity system (in which their
surviving spouses would receive the greater amount of $5,000 or the amount due
under the system), or nonparticipation (in which case a surviving spouse would
receive only $5,000). H.R. RE'. No. 1148, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [herein-
after cited as HOUSE REPORT].
77 28 U.S.C. § 376 (1970),
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year in a judicial survivors annuity fund insure the payment of an
annuity ranging between $3,500 a year, for the spouse of a district
judge with only five years of judicial service, to a maximum of
$22,500, for the spouse of a Supreme Court Justice with 30 years
of creditable service.78 If a judge dies prior to completing five
years of service, his designated beneficiary receives the return of
the contributions the judge made to the fund plus interest at the
munificent rate of three percent per annum.79
The value of these fringe benefits is extremely difficult to es-
timate. Though it is possible to make an actuarial estimate of the
cost of funding judicial pensions on the assumption that all judges
retire at a set age,80 a great many federal judges prefer to continue
on active status long after they are eligible to retire.8' Moreover,
the overwhelming majority of "retired" judges continue to per-
78 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 76, at 4. The maximum annual pension
for surviving spouses of district and circuit judges would be $15,000 and $15,937.50,
respectively. The average award in 1974 was $5,935. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 131 (1974).
79 28 U.S.C. § 376(i) (Supp. 1976).
80 An actuarial study of the Supreme Court found that Justices appointed
since 1901 had a life expectancy 1.4 years longer than their contemporaries in
the general population. Metropolitan Life, Longevity and the Supreme Court
Bench, STATISTICAL BULL. 2, 3 (Oct. 1971). A prior study of 540 prominent
judges and lawyers conducted by the Statistical Bureau of Metropolitan Life found
that the mortality rate for this selected group of jurists was 25 percent below
that of their contemporaries in the general population. Id. at 4. This suggests
that it is reasonable to extrapolate the greater life expectancy of Supreme Court
Justices to the federal judiciary as a whole.
The average age of a Supreme Court Justice at appointment is 52.5.
Id. at 2. This is nearly identical to the average age at appointment of federal
judges generally between 1946 and 1962. See J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND
JUDGES 200 (1965). If we assume that the average age of a federal judge at
appointment is 52.5 and that his life expectancy is 1.4 years longer than that of
his contemporaries in the general population, we can calculate the approximate
cost of purchasing an annuity equal to a judge's salary from a set age, say 65 or
70, to the end of his life expectancy.
The remaining life expectancy of members of the general population attaining
age 70 is 12 years, while the life expectancy used to calculate individual annuities
for males for 1971 is 13.76 years. LIFE INSURAN CE FACT BOOK 105 (1975).
Since a group annuity life expectancy would be less than an individual rate but
judges as a group would have a longer than normal life expectancy, 14 years
is assumed to be the life expectancy. Using an annual interest rate of five percent,
the annual amounts that would be required to fund an annuity paying Supreme
Court Justices a salary of $63,000 after age 70 would be $22,167.12. Annual
payments to fund annuities of present salaries for circuit judges and district
judges would be $15,692.92 and $14,778.09, respectively.
81 Only 23 of the 64 Justices eligible to retire since 1869 have actually
retired; their average length of retirement was only 7.2 years. (Two Justices,
Hunt and Moody, who became disabled prior to eligibility for retirement, were
allowed to retire by means of special legislation.) Calculated from data in 4
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at Chart J
(L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969); W. LOCKrART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, app. A (4th ed. 1975).
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form "substantial service. ' 82  In order to place a value on judicial
retirement benefits, it seems reasonable to treat all federal judges as
semi-retired at seventy.8 Table IX shows estimates of the changes
in the real value of total judicial compensation from 1854 to 1975.
The percentage of gross income attributable to fringe benefits has
risen substantially, from 12.6 percent in 1869 when judges were
first permitted to retire on full salary, to 22.5 percent in 1975. Half
of this increase is due to the government's matching contributions
to the survivors' annuity fund, life insurance premiums, and hos-
pitalization benefits; the other half is attributable to the increase
in the life expectancy of judges during the twentieth century.
8 4
While adding fringe benefits to the calculation of judicial com-
pensation renders the decline in the real disposable income of fed-
eral judges less acute, as Table IX of the Appendix reveals, judi-
cial compensation for all federal judges peaked in real economic
-terms with congressional raises extended in March 1969.5 Since
1970, the real value of total compensation has fallen twenty-four
percent. Thus, even after allowance for the value of fringe benefits,
in recent years real judicial income has been sharply reduced.
D. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion indicates that Congress has peri-
odically allowed the real economic value of judicial compensation
to be diminished substantially by inflation and increased case loads
in direct contravention of the intention of the Framers. This con-
clusion remains valid despite the difficulty in assessing precisely
how much liberal retirement and disability benefits add to the
economic value of judicial compensation.
III. THE DECLINE IN THE STATUS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
The preceding section has outlined the significant decrease
in the real economic value of the income of federal judges. An
82 There are presently 161 senior or "retired" federal judges. "Substantial
service," as determined by the chief judge, is being performed by 145 of these
judges. Only 2 of the 161 retired judges have resigned their commissions. Carrol
Interview, note 71 supra.
83 This means that the cost of funding an annuity for a judge's salary for
14 years would be reduced by 50 percent.
84 The life expectancy of a Supreme Court Justice from 1789 to 1901 was
the same as the general population. Metropolitan Life, supra note 80, at 2-3. It
may be that the greatest fringe benefit of all has been relief from having to ride
circuit which seems the most logical explanation for the dramatic improvement in
comparative mortality statistics.
85 In that month, judicial salary increases which were previously recom-
mended to Congress by the President on January 15, 1969, went into effect.
Recommendations of the President, Executive, Legislative & Judicial Salaries,
Act of Jan. 15, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 83 Stat. 863.
330 [Vol. 24: 308
1976] THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY 331
equally disturbing phenomenon is the decrease in the income of
federal judges relative to both the general population and other
members of the legal profession. In short, the station in life of
federal judges in relation to both the public and other attorneys
has been steadily declining.
A. The Decline in Judicial Income Relative to National Growth
The economic growth of the United States in its 200-year ex-
istence has been spectacular, averaging approximately 3.5 percent
a year in real terms.8" However, the federal judiciary has not re-
ceived its fair share of this huge growth in gross national product.
Indeed, during substantial periods of our history real judicial sal-
aries have declined, while real national income has grown by leaps
and bounds. For example, during the last forty years, real na-
tional income grew by 456 percent, 7 while the salaries of Associ-
ate Justices and circuit court judges declined by 19.7 percent and
9 percent, respectively.""
Even more meaningful for the federal judiciary is a compari-
son of the change in their real disposable income relative to that
of the aggregate population. 9 During the twentieth century, the fed-
eral judiciary has experienced a dramatic decline in real disposa-
ble income. Table X of the Appendix indicates that the real af-
ter-tax income of Associate Justices decreased by 41.5 percent in
the last forty years, from $13,625 to $7,977 (in 1910 dollars).
Circuit judges experienced a 29.2 percent drop in real after-tax
income during this same period, from $8,515 to $6,031 (in 1910
dollars).9 District judges suffered the smallest decline, 15.8
percent, their income dropping from $6,812 to $5,732 (in 1910
dollars).91 These declines are even more precipitous for judges
residing in regions having substantial state and local income taxes.
For example, a Second Circuit judge working in New York City
86 See AMERICAN ECONOMIC GRowTH: AN ECONOMIS'S HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 22, 35 (L. Davis et al. eds. 1972).
87 U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 448-49 (reference ed. 1975). This percentage was calculated from
national income figures for the years 1935 and 1974, the 1974 figure deflated by
coefficients taken from the Consumer Price Index.
88 These figures were computed by reference to Appendix, Table IV infra.
89 Disposable income is the income retained by individuals after taxes, often
referred to as "take-home pay." After various adjustments, disposable income is
often used to measure changes in the standard of living. McGRAw-HILL DICTION-
ARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 172 (2d ed. 1973) (referring to "disposable personal
income"). Real disposable income is simply disposable income adjusted for in-
flation. The concept is being utilized here, as it frequently is, to measure the
changes in the standard of living of various societal groups on a comparative basis.
90 Appendix, Table XI infra.
91 Appendix, Table XII infra.
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pays a combined state and city income tax of $791.20 (in 1910
dollars).92 This additional tax burden means that a New York
circuit judge's real disposable income has actually declined an ad-
ditional 9.3 percent since 1935, a total decrease of 38.5 percent
in forty years. An Associate Justice subject to the District of Co-
lumbia's income tax pays an additional $735.78 (in 1910 dol-
lars),9 s producing a combined drop in real disposable income of
46.9 percent since 1935.
Prior to 1939, federal judges were considered constitutionally
exempt from income taxes.94 This explains only part of the de-
92 The figure is $4,555.62 in current dollars. This tax rate assumes no
taxable income besides judicial salary, two exemptions and deductions of 18 percent
of gross income. The New York state income tax would amount to $3,693.90,
while the New York City income tax would amount to $861.72.
93 The figure is $4,236 in current dollars. This income tax is calculated
upon the same' assumptions made in note 92 supra.
94 During the Civil War period an attempt was made to collect taxes
from federal judges. Chief Justice Taney responded by issuing an advisory opin-
ion in the form of a protest letter to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Taney
letter concluded that such a levy blatantly violated the compensation clause;
otherwise, the legislature might diminish judicial compensation at its pleasure.
Letter from Chief Justice Taney to Mr. Chase, Feb. 16, 1863, reprinted as an
Appendix at 157 U.S. 701 (1894). When the Attorney General issued an opinion
which also concluded that the levy violated the compensation clause, the Treasury
ceased trying to collect taxes from federal judges. Fellman, supra note 14, at 94.
The issue was rejoined in 1919 when Congress specifically imposed income tax lia-
bility on the salaries of the federal judiciary. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 213,
40 Stat. 1065. That section of the Income Tax Act of 1919 was declared uncon-
stitutional the following year in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). Justice
Van Devanter's opinion noted that:
[T]he primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was. . . to
attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that inde-
pendence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance
of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitu-
tion . ..
Obviously diminution may be effected in more ways than one. Some
may be direct and others indirect, or even evasive as Mr. Hamilton sug-
gested. But all which by their necessary operation and effect withhold
or take from the judge a part of that which has been promised by law
for his services must be regarded as within the prohibition.
Id. at 253-54.
Despite Evans, the government persisted in its attempt to tax the salaries of
federal judges, although in a more selective fashion. In 1920, the Attorney Gen-
eral issued an opinion which concluded that the salaries of judges appointed after
the enactment of the Revenue Act challenged in Evans were fully taxable. 32
Op. ATr'Y GEN. 248 (1920). He reasoned that Congress was free to set the
salaries of judges who had not yet taken office and that Congress had in effect
chosen to set judicial salaries at a certain amount minus taxes. The Supreme Court
rejected this reasoning in Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925). Mr. Justice
McReynolds, without supplying a detailed argument, simply explained:
The words and history of the clause indicate that the purpose was to
impose upon Congress the duty definitely to declare what sum shall be
received by each judge out of the public funds and the times for payment.
When this duty has been complied with the amount specified becomes
the compensation which is protected against diminution during his con-
tinuance in office.
Id. at 508-09.
Evans and Miles were not the last words that the Court was to express on
1976] THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY 333
cline, however. Between 1940 and 1975, the real disposable in-
come of Associate Justices still fell by 36.5 percent, only 5 per-
cent less than the 1935-1975 decline. Much more significant in
explaining the decline is the increase in effective tax rates. In
1940, federal income taxes consumed only 5.79 percent of an As-
sociate Justice's salary and only 3.4 percent of a district judge's sal-
ary. In 1975, the effective federal income tax rate for Associate
Justices and district judges had grown to 27.1 percent and 21.4
percent, respectively. Judicial salaries have not risen fast enough
to make up the difference.95
the issue of taxation of judicial incomes. In O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S.
277 (1939), the Court repudiated both Evans and Miles and held that a nondis-
criminatory general income tax may be applied to federal judges without diminish-
ing judicial compensation within the meaning of the compensation clause.
Though O'Malley did not say a word about inflation, it can be argued that
the result of its holding supports the proposition that the compensation clause
protects only the nominal value of judicial salaries from diminution. Functionally,
inflation is a tax, redistributing wealth from the private sector to the government.
See generally A. MORAO, ON TAXES AND INFLATION 143 (1965); Friedman, Mone-
tary Correction, in ESSAYS ON INFLATION AND INDEXATION 25, 29 (1974). If a
direct tax on the incomes of federal judges is constitutional, the indirect, implicit
tax resulting from inflation seems a fortiori constitutional.
95 To be sure, an analysis of changes in the real economic value of judicial
compensation should not focus only on the burdens of taxation and ignore the
benefits derived from governmental expenditures. Several studies have attempted
to estimate both the benefits and burdens from taxation, though none divide tax-
payers into groups which closely correspond to the income levels of federal
judges. See, e.g., R. & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND ,PRACTICE
375-402 (2d ed. 1976); TAX FOUNDATION, TAX BURDENS AND BENEFIT OF Gov-
ERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY INCOME CLASS, 1961 AND 1965 (1967); Gillespie,
Effect of Public Expenditures on the Distribution of Income, in ESSAYS IN FISCAL
FEDERALISM 122 (R. Musgrave ed. 1965); Musgrave, Case & Leonard, The Dis-
tribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits, 2 PUB. FIN. Q. 259 (1974).
The Musgrave studies provide the greatest discrimination, dividing taxpayers
into ten income groups, but federal judges are still combined with taxpayers
earning between $35,500 and $92,000. The Tax Foundation study combines
all taxpayers earning more than $15,000, while the Gillespie study aggregates
all taxpayers earning more than $10,000 similarly. TAX FOUNDATION, supra at 13.
These studies do suggest, however, that the tax burden on federal judges exceeds
the benefit derived from expenditures by approximately 8.5 to 27.7 percent of
the total.
Using data derived from 1968 tax receipts and governmental expenditures,
and assuming that benefits are allocated in line with tax burdens, the Musgrave
study estimates that taxpayers with incomes between $35,500 and $92,000 would
have a total net benefit from the fiscal system of -8.5 percent. -Musgrave, Case
& Leonard, supra at 294. The study in R. & P. MUSGRAVE, supra at 397, reaches
almost the same conclusion. The Tax Foundation study, using a 1961 data base
and somewhat different assumptions, estimated that taxpayers with incomes ex-
ceeding $15,000 would have a total net benefit from the fiscal system of -27 per-
cent. TAX FOUNDATION, supra at 14, 17. Using a 19,65 data base, the Tax Foun-
dation estimated the total net benefit of the fiscal system to taxpayers earning
more than $15,000 at -27.7 percent. Id. at 20-21. Using 1960 data Gillespie
estimated the total net benefit from the fiscal system for taxpayers earning more
than $10,000 a year at -13.2 percent. Gillespie, supra at 162.
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The more relevant question, however, is a relative one: How
do changes over time in the real disposable income of the federal
judges compare to those of the population at large? Table XIII
of the Appendix compares the real disposable income of federal
judges since 1910 with that of the entire United States population.
.The figures demonstrate that since 1935, the real disposable in-
come of federal judges has declined, while per capita real dispos-
able income in the United States has risen rapidly. Between 1935
and 1975, per capita real disposable income in the United States
grew by 189 percent; in contrast, the real disposable income of
Associate Justices and circuit judges fell by twenty-nine percent,
while that of district judges fell by sixteen percent. The longer per-
iod from 1910 to 1975 exhibits a similar trend. During the last
sixty-five years real disposable income of the entire population has
more than tripled; the real disposable income of Associate Justices,
circuit judges, and district judges has fallen 36.2 percent, 13.8
percent, and 4.5 percent, respectively. This means that federal
judges have not been sharing in the general increase in wealth and
productivity, and that their relative position or station in life has
been allowed to decline substantially in the twentieth century. 9
B. The Decline in Judicial Incomes Relative to Attorney
Incomes
Historically, the United States has not paid its judges very
generously, particularly in comparison with the salaries paid to Brit-
ish judges.9 7  Federal judges' salaries in the past have generally
90 The economic straits of the federal judiciary have been exacerbated by
limitations on outside income imposed in the wake of the controversy over dis-
closure of Mr. Justice Fortas' acceptance of a substantial sum (later returned)
for services to be performed for a private foundation. See Ainsworth, Judicial
Ethics-The Federal Judiciary Seeks Modern Standards of Conduct, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 470 (1970). In June 1969, the Judicial Conference of the United
States adopted a resolution prohibiting federal judges from accepting compensation
for performance of extrajudicial services, unless approved by the judicial council
of the judge's circuit after a determination that such services are in the public
interest or justified by exceptional circumstances and will not interfere with judi-
cial duties. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 42 (1969). For a
selective summary of past extrajudicial activities of Supreme Court Justices, see
McKay, The Judiciary and Non-Judicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
9, 27-36 (1970).
97 Prior to 1826, English judges had lavish rights of patronage, from which
they derived considerable income. These rights were abolished in 1826, when the
salary of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench was set at £10,000 ($48,655) plus
a pension of £4,000 per annum. The Chief Justice of the Common Pleas received
£8,000 ($38,932), the Master of Rolls £7,000 ($34,065), and the puisne judges
received £5,500 ($26,765). H. CECIL, TIPPING THE SCALES 227 (1964). In 1830
the salaries of the puisne judges were reduced to £5,000 a year. The salaries of
the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench and the Common Pleas Court were re-
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been below those of successful lawyers and above those of state
judges. The gap that exists between the earnings of a federal
judge and the earnings of a successful lawyer has, however, been
steadily widening. 8 Concomitantly, the once substantial pecuni-
ary advantage that a federal judge possessed over a state judge has
been steadily diminishing. With these relative declines in the in-
come of federal judges, the prestige of the office, something the
Framers sought to preserve, 99 has declined.
While data as to the incomes of attorneys over time is
sparse, 100 the available evidence strongly suggests that the income
sacrifice associated with appointment to the federal bench has
been increasing significantly. Since the nineteenth century, the
salaries of most federal judges have been below the earnings of
successful lawyers. For example, in 1827, when Supreme Court
Justices were earning $4,500,101 a very successful New York law-
yer's income was between $6,000 and $8,000,102 a thirty-three to
seventy-eight percent differential. However, in 1964, when Su-
preme Court Justices were earning $39,500, it was common for
senior partners in Wall Street law firms to make $100,000 or more
annually, a 153 percent differential. 0
duced to £8,000 and £7,000 respectively in 1851, though the Lord Chancellor
continued to receive £ 10,000. Id. at 229. Since then, the real disposable income
of British judges has been declining, for salaries remained fixed at these levels
for the next 103 years despite the exactions of taxes and inflation. Nevertheless,
it was not until 1955 (the pound was devalued to $2.80 in 1949) that the Chief
Justice of the United States began to earn more than the Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain. By 1970, the Lord Chancellor was earning only £14,500 ($40,600).
H. CECIL, THE ENGLISH JUDGE 39 (1970).
98 This analysis assumes that any comparison of judicial salaries with those
of private practitioners should utilize the income figures of the more successful
practitioners only. Few would deny that the average federal judge has the ability,
experience, drive and contacts to rank among the top practicing attorneys. Indeed,
many federal judges are drawn precisely from those ranks. Hence, the more
appropriate standard for comparison should be the net income of a leading
practitioner, rather than the income of the average lawyer.
99 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
100 The National Income Division of the Office of Business Income Eco-
nomics generated data from mail surveys about the income of lawyers between
1929 and 1954. The results of those surveys are reported in Weinfield, Income of
Lawyers, 1929-1948, in U.S. DFP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS
18 (Aug. 1949); Liebenberg, Income of Lawyers in the Postwar Period, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Dec. 1956, at 26. See also
Income of Physicians, Dentists, and Lawyers, 1949-1951, U.S. DEP'T OF CoM-
MERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, July 1952, at 5. For subsequent data,
see generally York & Hale, Too Many Lawyers? The Legal Services Industry:
Its Structure and Outlook, 26 J. LEG. ED. 1, 16-21 (1973); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURNS 32, 136 et seq.
(1972).
101 See Appendix, Table I infra.
102 S. BALDWIN, supra note 14, at 355-56.
108 E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 229 (1964).
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In 1974, a survey conducted by Daniel J. Cantor & Co. dis-
closed that the average earnings of a partner in a North American
law firm at age fifty was approximately $90,000, and that twenty-
five percent of that class earned $100,000 or more. 1 4  A Su-
preme Court Justice in 1974 was earning $60,000 annually, one-
third less than the average partner in the Cantor survey.
Further evidence of the decline in the prestige and status of
the federal judiciary is found by comparing the earnings of first-
year lawyers to the earnings of district court judges. In 1964, a
federal district court judge was being paid 3.85 times the salary of-
fered to law school graduates by the top New York firms. 105 By
1968, that multiple shrank to 2, as the leading New York firm
boosted starting salaries fifty percent.'06 By 1976, the gap was
further reduced to a multiple of only 1.68.107
Evidence of the decline in the prestige of the federal judici-
ary does not stop with a comparison of judicial remuneration
with incomes of private practitioners; the decline can be demon-
strated by a comparison of the salaries of federal judges with the
salaries of state court judges. Historically, state judges have not
been well compensated.01 Until recently, a federal judgeship
had been regarded as the better paying and more prestigious of
the two positions. In 1969, only one state, New York, paid its
highest ranking judge more than a federal district judge. 10 In
1974, in contrast, judges in more than twenty states were being paid
as much or more than federal district judges. 110
C. Conclusion
The decline in the station in life and the prestige of federal
judges thwarts one of the main goals of the Framers in establishing
a federal judiciary: that of attracting the finest possible legal
104 Darby, Legal Economics and You: Earnings of Lawyers in Private Prac-
tice, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 666, 669 (1975).
105 In 1964, starting salaries in private practice generally ranged from $3,600
to $7,800. Utley, Rising Starting Salaries: Bane or Blessing?, 55 A.B.A.J. 660
(1969).
108 In 1968, the leading New York firms increased salaries offered recent
law school graduates from $10,000 to $15,000. Id.
107 For 1976, starting salaries at the leadingNew York firms have been set
at $25,000. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, § F, at 13, cols. 1-3.
108 In 1806 the Chief Justice of Massachusetts received $2,500 a year. When
Theophilus Parsons tendered his resignation because he could not live on his
salary, the legislature raised it by $1,000. S. BALDWIN, supra note 14, at 329-30.
In 1891, Rhode Island was paying its Chief Justice only $750 per annum, plus
some trifling fees. Id. at 330.
109 A CASE FOR AN IMMEDIATE SALARY INCREASE, supra note 65, at app. F.
See also Chapin, supra note 71, at 196.
110 A CASE FOR AN IMMEDIATE SALARY INCREASE, supra note 65, at app. F.
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talent to serve on the bench. A recent report by three members of
the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries
indicates that the Framers correctly foresaw the pernicious conse-
quences of the failure to ensure adequate levels of judicial com-
pensation:
It is essential that among the appointees to the Judiciary,
there be a substantial number of the most able and talented
young men and women. Yet, these are the very persons who
are least able to make the financial sacrifice which leaving the
bar and ascending to the bench involves today. Anyone who
has been connected with judicial selection knows how many
times recruitment of the most qualified lawyers among those
available for judicial appointment is frustrated by their inabil-
ity to accept the financial sacrifice that is entailed.111
IV. REFORMING THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF
JUDICIAL COMPENSATION
The Federal Salary Act of 1967112 set up a Commission on
Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries to make quadrennial
salary recommendations to the President for federal judges and
other high-echelon federal officials. Under this statutory scheme,
the President was to recommend salary levels for these offices
to Congress in his budget message. These recommendations
would become effective unless Congress enacted a conflicting
law or specifically disapproved all or part of the President's
recommendations. Though laudable in concept, the scheme has
thus far not worked well. The only adjustments under the Act
took place in January 1969, under the Johnson administration.11
President Nixon did not even appoint a new Commission until De-
cember 1972, far too late to include a recommendation for
1973. The Commission's report was then delayed for more than
a year, and the recommended raises were killed in the Senate in
March 1974.114
11 Report of the Second Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial
Salaries (1973), quoted in Goldberg, Brief, supra note 11, at 25 n.13. Deputy
Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr., a former federal judge, even more
recently told the Commission that "there is strong circumstantial evidence, if not
direct evidence, that current Federal pay scales are discouraging qualified men
and women from taking jobs in the judiciary." N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1976, § 1,
at 37, cols. 2-4. Mr. Tyler also reportedly stated that federal judges "could make
three to six times" as much as they are currently being paid if they were in
private practice; "they feel diminished and demeaned when they see what others
in the profession are able to accomplish in terms of compensation." Id.
112 2 U.S.C. §§ 351 etseq. (1970).
11s The Commission recommended salaries of $65,000 for Associate Justices,
$50,000 for circuit judges, and $47,500 for district judges. President Johnson
reduced these recommendations in his budget submission, and Congress accepted
the presidential recommendations. Sprecher, supra note 8, at 381.
114 33 CoNG. Q. 1683 (1975). The Commission recommended a 25 percent
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On August 9, 1975, Congress enacted the Executive Salary
Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act.115 Passed with a minimum of
publicity as a rider to an obscure Postal Service bill, this statute
provides for annual automatic pay adjustments for the Vice Presi-
dent, Executive Schedule and top-level civil service employees,
members of Congress, and the federal judiciary. The salaries of
these government officials are to be adjusted by the same compar-
ability method as that employed by the Federal Civil Service Com-
mission to ensure that General Schedule salaries keep pace with
private sector salaries. 116 To avert potential compensation clause
problems, a ratchet-type provision prevents a downward adjust-
ment in judicial salaries. 117
The Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act is hard-
ly a satisfactory answer to the salary dilemma of the federal judici-
ary. The Act makes no effort to restore real judicial income to
1969 levels." 8 Moreover, no attempt is made to compensate for
the substantial losses incurred by the judiciary in the past six years
due to Congress' failure to comply with the spirit of the compen-
sation clause of article III, section 1.119 While the introduction
of quasi-automatic annual salary revisions is a welcome step,
the measure does not go nearly far enough. Judicial salaries
are still linked to the political football of Congressional salaries.
As experience has shown, this linkage must be severed in order to
maintain the real economic value of judicial compensation. 2 '
pay raise in 1973. President Nixon modified that recommendation to 7.5 per-
cent increases in 1974, 1975, and 1976, with a single 7.5 percent raise for Cabinet
Secretaries and Supreme Court Justices. Id.
115 Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419 (1975).
116 Id. §§ 202-05. There is a problem, however, in applying a comparability
method to judicial salary structures. While services performed by most federal
employees can be compared with similar services performed in the private sector,
the concept of comparability with the private sector is essentially meaningless for
judges qua judges. State judges' salaries might serve as a rough guide. In this
regard, the available data indicate that the salaries of federal judges are declining
relative to the salaries of state judges. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
117 Pub. L. No. 94-82, § 205(b), 89 Stat. 419 (1975). Whether such a
rachet is constitutionally required is unclear. Booth v. United States, discussed in
note 29 supra, suggests that such a provision is mandated by the compensation
clause.
118 In implementing the Act, President Ford had the option under the Act
of increasing the salaries of government employees by a range of 5 to 8.6 percent
beginning in October 1975; he chose the 5 percent figure as an economy measure.
Congress allowed the President's determination to stand. Wall St. J., Sept. 19,
1975, at 1, col. 5.
119 Table VII of the Appendix shows that the real income lost to the Judi-
ciary between 1969 and 1975 from inflation was $79,836 for Associate Justices,
$56,550 for circuit judges, and $53,124 for district judges. These totals would have
been considerably higher, had the fringe benefits discussed in, notes 71-85 &
accompanying text infra been included.
120 See note 8 & accompanying text supra. The Commission on Executive,
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A more desirable solution lies in a statute which would re-
store the real income of the federal judicary at least to 1969 lev-
els 2  and automatically maintain those levels. To restore pre-tax
March 1969 incomes, without an offsetting provision for the
higher rate of income taxation, judicial salaries would have to be
raised to the following levels: Associate Justices, $92,000; circuit
judges, $65,167; and district judges, $61,333.122 In an inflation-
ary economy, a statute which raised judicial salaries to these levels
would soon become obsolete, however. No sooner would judges
be restored to an income peak than inflation would begin to erode
their salaries' real value. To avoid this erosion, judicial salaries
should be adjusted periodically to reflect increases in the Con-
sumer Price Index. 2 ' To avoid any potential compensation
clause problem posed by deflation, 2 4 indexing should not be per-
mitted to diminish nominal salary levels. In the event that the
Legislative and Judicial Salaries has just recommended to President Ford that
salaries of the district and circuit judges be raised to $62,500 and $65,000
respectively. President Ford has the option of including such recommendations
in his budget message to Congress on January 17, 1977; if he does so, the
recommendations will automatically become law unless one of the houses of
Congress disapproves them within 30 days. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1976, § 1, at
40, cols. 2-3.
121 The real disposable income of Supreme Court Justices was at an all-time
high in 1911, when the Justices received $14,500, tax-free. The real disposable
income of circuit judges peaked in 1933, at $12,500 tax-free. The salary levels
established in March 1969 represented a peak in terms of real disposable income
only for the district judges. However, when fringe benefits are included, March
1969 represents a peak for the Justices and circuit judges as well. These figures
were deduced from data found in tables II, VIII, IX and X of the Appendix, plus
Consumer Price Index numbers for the years omitted from these tables.
122 The figures in the text are based upon a coefficient derived from the
Consumer Price Index, which rose 53.33, percent between March 1969 and No-
vember 1975. The dollar amounts necessary to restore the judges' peak dis-
posable income levels are considerably higher; present salaries would have to be
raised to $176,915 for Associate Justices, $93,667 for circuit judges, and $79,064
for district judges. These calculations represent amounts of gross income neces-
sary at present federal income tax rates for married taxpayers to produce dis-
posable incomes of $84,048, $52,287, and $46,267, which are the equivalents in
present dollars of the real disposable income peaks of the Justices, circuit judges,
and district judges, respectively. These calculations make no allowances for state
and local income taxes, nor for deductions from gross income.
123 The idea that judicial salaries should be indexed to changes in the cost
of living has been advanced by various commentators. See, e.g., Diversities De La
Ley, 21 ILL. L. REv. 312 (1926); Compensation, supra note 9, at 608.
Beginning in 1977, the Bureau of Labor Statistics will publish two versions
of the Consumer Price Index: the present index, geared to the consumption pat-
terns of wage earners and clerical personnel; and a more broadly-based index,
geared to the consumption patterns of the great bulk of the population. The latter
version of the Consumer Price -Index will more closely approximate the cost of
living for federal judges because it will be geared to expenditure patterns of a
larger segment of the population. See Duscha, supra note 45, at 1, 8.
124 See note 29 supra.
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Consumer Price Index declines, the index points should simply be
banked and subtracted from future increases in the index.
Indexing judicial salaries offers two significant advantages
over the present system. First, the revision is automatic. This ef-
fectively insulates the judiciary from perennial political squabbles
about how often and how much to raise salaries. Second, fre-
quent periodic adjustment will insure that judges' real incomes will
not be significantly eroded by future inflation. Indexing will not,
however, completely protect the real incomes of the federal judici-
ary. Under the present system of progressive income taxation,
during an inflationary period, taxpayers whose real gross income
remains constant find their real disposable income reduced be-
cause they have moved into higher tax brackets.'25 This kind of
shift, however, affects taxpayers generally;126 eventually, sufficient
political pressure is generated to reduce effective tax rates across
the board. Because judges may constitutionally be subjected to a
nondiscriminatory income tax, special protection against this form
of inflation-induced decline in real income is unnecessary. 27
Two refinements to this indexing proposal deserve serious
consideration: varying judicial salaries to comport with regional
differences in the cost of living, and adjusting judicial salaries an-
nually for productivity increases. Both refinements, though equi-
table, present serious implemental problems.
Though it costs substantially more to live in large cities such
as Boston or New York than in less densely populated areas,1 21 ju-
125 See Rosenn, Adaptations of the Brazilian Income Tax to Inflation, 21
STAN. L. REV. 58, 68, 92 (1968); Comment, Inflation and the Federal Income
Tax, 82 YALE L.J. 716, 729 (1973).
126 The effect of this shift does, however, tend to burden lower income tax-
payers more than higher income taxpayers. See Comment, Inflation and the Fed-
eral Income Tax, supra note 125, at 738.
127 The implicit tax levied directly on judicial salaries by inflation presents
a very different problem, for the normal constraints of the political process are
unlikely to check congressional inaction which adversely affects the real income
of the judiciary. Linkage with congressional salaries exposes judicial salaries to
the same fear of adverse voter reaction that Congress has about raising its own
salaries during an inflationary period. Moreover, more than 50 million individuals
in this country have all or part of their incomes shielded from inflation through
escalator clauses. Dale, Some People Find Inflation Delightful, N.Y. Times, May
12, 1974, § 3, at 2, col. 3. Millions of others have sufficient economic or political
clout to ensure that their real incomes rise or remain constant during an inflation-
ary period. But federal judges lack that kind of clout. They cannot effectively
strike to protect their salaries from inflation, and the number of votes represented
by the federal judiciary is politically insignificant. While in a very real sense the
federal judiciary wields enormous power, using that power for personal economic
gain is -the kind of compromise of judicial independence that the Framers intended
to prevent by enacting the compensation clause.
128 The BLS index of comparative costs for a high budget family of four
shows that in the autumn of 1974, it cost 23 percent more to live in New York
City and 14 percent less to live in Austin, Texas than in the average United
States urban area. 98 MoNTHLY LAB. Rnv. 46 (June 1975).
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dicial salaries are uniform across the country. There is an obvious
equity involved in according higher cost of living adjustments to
those whose cost of living has risen more rapidly than that of oth-
ers. 129 Moreover, alternative employment opportunities tend to be
higher in the large cities; these are the areas that have had the bulk
of judicial resignations and rejections of proffered judicial appoint-
ments. 180 The Bureau of Labor Statistics maintains regional cost
of living indices so that some judicial salaries could be adjusted in
proportion to changes in the particular area in which a judge re-
sides.''
It is doubtful, however, that this refinement is worth the ad-
ministrative headache of calculating individual salary levels and
the possibility of complaints of unfairness in disparate salary lev-
els. To be consistent, base salaries should also be adjusted for dif-
ferentials in living costs, which would further complicate salary
calculations. Some judges reside in areas for which no local cost
of living index is available. Some judges reside in one place and
sit in others. Certain important costs, such as the cost of a college
education, are poorly measured by regional price indexes. Given'
the relatively small regional variations,1 2 the costs of adopting
such a refinement appear to outweigh the benefits.
The other refinement, according productivity increases to
federal judges, has both equity and the intent of the Framers to
commend it. Calculating a productivity rate for federal judges
poses an intractable problem, however. There is no accurate
yardstick by which to measure judicial productivity. The most
commonly asserted criterion, the number of cases terminated per
judge, is a highly misleading basis for productivity data. Some
cases can be decided summarily; others require protracted consid-
eration. This variation is usually a function of the complexity of
a particular case, but may also be a function of the skill, experi-
ence and preparation of court and counsel.
The number of signed opinions is another frequently used
benchmark of judicial productivity, but it conceals a number of im-
129 See Compensation, supra note 9, at 608-09.
180 See Sprecher, supra note 8, at 384.
131 The Bureau of Labor Statistics computes consumer price indices for 23
cities of standard metropolitan statistical areas: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Buf-
falo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Honolulu, Houston, Kansas
City, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington, D.C.
182 With the exception of Anchorage, Boston, Honolulu and New York, the
variations in living costs appear to be essentially within ten percentage points of
the national average. Considerable room for argument exists about the proper
weight of such indices. See 98 MONTHLY LAB. RLv. 8-14 (Apr. 1975). But see
Compensation, supra note 9, at 608, where it is suggested that an index plan for
judicial compensation should be adjusted to account for geographical variations
in the Consumer Price Index.
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portant variables. Some opinions are masterful, literate treat-
ments of the issues; others are, at least in the opinion of academic
observers of the process, far off the mark. Dissenting and concur-
ring opinions are often far shorter than majority opinions, but the
length of an opinion can be a misleading indicator of both the time
and effort that went into it and of the quality of the decision.
Cases which consume a great deal of time and effort may be dis-
posed of by per curiam opinions or unsigned orders; even disposi-
tion of motions can be exceedingly time-consuming. Deciding to
abstain or not to decide a certain case may be just as important and
demanding as actually deciding the case. Furthermore, giving
Congress or an administrative agency the role of overseeing judi-
cial decisions for the purpose of granting or withholding productiv-
ity pay increases is likely to do more harm than good to judicial in-
dependence. Tying productivity increases to unweighted case load
statistics is likely to exacerbate judicial reluctance to sit on cases
which are exceptionally difficult or time-consuming. It might also
encourage courts to give litigants short shrift. Devising and apply-
ing a system for weighting cases sufficiently well calibrated for sal-
ary purposes is so complex that it would doubtless serve as a source
of perpetual controversy between the judiciary and any administer-
ing agency.
While it does not seem practicable to link judicial salaries to
case loads, this does not mean that judicial productivity should be
ignored for compensation purposes. As a judge acquires experi-
ence, his productivity will increase, at least up to a certain point.
Perhaps the easiest way to take this factor into account is to pro-
vide for annual productivity increases of two to three percent of
salary for each year of service on the federal bench. Upon the as-
sumption that there is a point of diminishing returns for judicial
experience, an outside limit of ten to fifteen years might be placed
upon eligibility for this increase.
CONCLUSION
By failing to maintain the real economic value of judicial sal-
aries, Congress has breached the moral duty which the compensa-
tion clause of article III, section 1, imposes upon it. Enactment
of legislation along the lines proposed in this Article will insure the
execution of the Framers' intent in enacting the compensation
clause. Such legislation will also help to reduce the alarming rate
of attrition among federal judges, and assure that the choice of
future judges will not be restricted to independently wealthy or me-
diocre lawyers. The country may then be spared the cost and em-
barrassment of the cyclical demoralization of the judiciary due to
legislative lags in maintaining real judicial incomes.
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APPENDIX
Table I-Changes in Nominal Salaries of Federal Judges, 1789-1975
Table II-Changes in Salaries of Federal Judges, 1789-1975, in 1789
Dollars
Table III-Changes in Real Salaries of Associate Justices in Five-Year
Intervals, 1789-1909, in 1789 Dollars
Table IV-Judicial Salaries in Five-Year Intervals, 1910-1975, in 1910
Dollars
Table V-Real Judicial Income Lost to Inflation, 1911-1926
Table VI-Real Judicial Income Lost to Inflation, 1946-1955
Table VII-Real Judicial Income Lost to Inflation, 1969-1975
Table VIII-Cases Terminated in Five-Year Intervals, 1910-1975
Table IX-Changes in Real Value of Total Judicial Compensation
(Salary & Fringe Benefits), 1854-1975
Table X-After-Tax Income of Supreme Court Justices in Five-Year
Intervals, 1935-1975
Table XI-After-Tax Income of Circuit Judges in Five-Year Intervals,
1935-1975
Table XII-After-Tax Income of District Judges in Five-Year Inter-
vals, 1935-1975
Table XIII--Comparison of Indices of Real Disposable Income
(R.D.I.) of Federal Judges and of the United States Population,
1910-1975, in 1910 Dollars
Table I




Associate In- Circuit In- District In-
Year Statute Justices crease Judges* crease Judges crease
1789 1 Stat. 72 $ 3,500 - - - $ 800- -
$1,800**
1819 3 Stat. 484 4,500 28.6 - - -
1855 10 Stat. 655 6,000 33.3 - - -
1869 16 Stat. 44 - - $ 5,000 - - -
1871 16 Stat. 494 8,000 33.3 6,000 20.0 -
1873 17 Stat. 486 10,000 25.0 - - -
1891 26 Stat. 783,826 - - - - 5,000
1903 32 Stat. 825 12,500 25.0 7,000 16.7 6,000 20.0
1911 36 Stat. 1152 14,500 16.0 - - - -
1919 40 Stat. 1156 - - 8,500 21.4 7,500 25.0
1926 44 Stat. 919 20,000 37.9 12,500 47.0 10,000 33.3
1946 60 Stat. 716 25,000 25.0 17,500 40.0 15,000 50.0
1955 69 Stat. 9 35,000 40.0 25,500 45.7 22,500 50.0
1964 78 Stat. 434 39,500 12.9 33,000 29.4 30,000 33.3
1969 83 Stat. 864 60,000 51.9 42,500 28.8 40,000 33.3
1975 89 Stat. 419 63,000 5.0 44,600 4.9 42,000 5.0
Circuit judges were first provided for in 1869. For purposes of this table,
they are equated with judges of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, first estab-
lished in 1891.
** Between 1789 and 1891, the salaries of federal district judges varied from
district to district. Increments were enacted sporadically and generally
affected only a portion of the sitting district judges. See Comment, Com-
pensation of the Federal Judiciary: A Reexamination, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
594, 612 (1975). After '1891, district judges were paid on a uniform basis.
To keep this table manageable, the variations in the salaries of district judges
between 1789 and 1891 have been omitted.
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* Index for 1789 to 1926 was computed from Wholesale Price Index in Table I
of G. WARREN & F. PEARSON, PmiCEs 10-13 (rev. ed. 1933), base 1910-1914= 100. Index for 1946 to 1975 was computed by converting the figures in
the Wholesale Price Index of the U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T
OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS Table 132 (reference ed. 1975),
base 1910-1914 = 100.
** Between 1789 and 1891, the salaries of federal district judges varied from
district to district. Increments were enacted sporadically and generally
affected only a portion of the sitting district judges. See Comment, Compen-
sation of the Federal Judiciary: A Reexamination, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 594,
612 (1975). After 1891, district judges were paid on a uniform basis. Tokeep this table manageable, the variations in the salaries of district judges
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Table III
Changes in Real Salaries of Associate Justices in Five-Year
Intervals, 1789-1909, in 1789 Dollars
Salary in
Nominal Salary Index* Purchasing Power
Year in Dollars 17-89 = 100 of 1789 Dollars
17-89 $ 3,500 100 $ 3,500
1794 3,500 126 2,787
1799 3,500 147 2,389
1804 3,500 147 2,389
1809 3,500 151 2,315
1814 3,500 212 1,654
1819 4,500 145 3,096
1824 4,500 114 3,949
1829 4,500 112 4,031
1834 4,500 105 4,300
1839 4,500 130 3,455
1844 4,500 90 5,026
1849 4,500 95 4,720
1854 4,500 126 3,583
1859 6,000 110 5,432
1864 6,000 124 2,674
1869 6,000 176 3,417
(1871)** (8,000) (151) (5,292)
1874 10,000 147 6,825
1879 10,000 105 9,556
1884 10,000 108 9,247
1889 10,000 106 10,617
1894 10,000 81 12,286
1899 10,000 90 11,169
1904 12,500 101 12,356
1909 12,500 115 10,859
(1911)** (14,500) (110) (13,126)
* Index was computed from Wholesale Price Index in G. WARREN & F. PEARSON,
PRICEs 10-13 (rev. ed. 1933), base 1910-1914 = 100.
** 1871 and 1911 are included to show the salary increases in those years.
Table IV
Judicial Salaries in Five-Year Intervals,
1910-1975, in 1910 Dollars
Associate Justices Circuit Judges District Judges
Index* Salary Salary Salary
1910 Nominal in 1910 Nominal in 1910 Nominal in 1910
= 100 Salary Dollars Salary Dollars Salary Dollars
Salary Salary Salary
1910 100.0 $12,500 $12,500.00 $ 7,000 $ 7,000.00 $ 6,000 $6,000.00
1915 108.6 14,500 13,355.26 7,000 6,447.37 6,000 5,526.32
1920 214.3 14,500 6,766.67 8,500 3,966.67 7,500 3,500.00
1925 187-5 14,500 7,733.33 8,500 4,533.33 7,500 4,000.00
1930 178.6 20,000 11,200.00 12,500 7,000.00 10,000 5,600.00
1935 146.8 20,000 13,625.30 12,500 8,515.82 10,000 6,812.65
1940 150.0 20,000 13,333.33 12,500 8,333.33 10,000 6,666.67
1945 192.5 20,000 10,389.61 12,500 6,493.51 10,000 5,194.81
1950 257.5 25,000 9,708.74 17,500 6,796.12 15,000 5,825.24
195.5 286.4 35,000 12,219.45 25,500 8,902.74 22,500 7,855.36
1960 316.8 35,000 11,048.48 25,500 8,049.61 22,500 7,102.59
1965 337.5 39,500 11,703.70 33,000 9,777.78 30,000 8,888.89
1970 415.4 60,000 14,445.40 42,500 10,232.16 40,000 9,630.27
1975 575.7 63,000 10,942.93 44,600 7,746.90 42,000 7,295.29
* Index was computed from Consumer Price Index in BLS Consumer Price Index,
base 1967 = 100.
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Table V
Real Judicial Income Lost to Inflation, 1911-1926
Lost Income (Current Dollars)**
Associate Circuit District
Year CPI* Justices Judges Judges
1911 28.0 - -
1912 29.0 $ 517.86 $ 250.00 $ 214.29
1913 29.7 880.36 425.00 364.29
1914 30.1 1,087.50 525.00 450.00
1915 30.4 1,242.86 600.00 514.29
1916 32.7 2,433.93 1,175.00 1,007.14
1917 38.4 5,385.71 2,600.00 2,228.57
1918 45.1 8,855.36 4,275.00 3,664.29
1919 51.8 12,325.00 5,950.00 5,100.00
1920 60.0 16,571.43 6,500.00t 5,357.14t
1921 53.6 13,257.14 4,900.00 3,985.71
1922 50.2 11,496.43 4,050.00 3,257.14
1923 51.1 11,962.50 4,275.00 3,450.00
1924 51.2 12,014.29 4,300.00 3,471.43
1925 52.5 12,687.50 4,625.00 3,750.00
1926 53.0 12,946.43 4,750.00 3,857.14
Totals 123,664.30 49,200.00 40,671.43
* Consumer Price Index numbers from BlS Consumer Price Index, base 1967
=100.
** "Current Dollars" refers to the individual year of computation.
t Circuit and district judges were given a $1,500 raise in 1919. This isolated
raise was subtracted from the lost income column from 1920-26 in order to
show the effect of inflation on judicial salaries over time. Had the raise been
added to the $7,000 salary base, the rest of the figures in this column would
be much higher, thereby presenting the misleading impression that despite an
increase in salary, more income was lost to inflation.
Table VI
Real Judicial Income Lost to Inflation, 1946-1955
Lost Income (Current Dollars) **
Associate Circuit District
Year CPI* Justices Judges Judges
1946 58.5 - -
1947 66.9. $ 3,589.74 $ 2,512.82 $ 2,153.85
1948 72.1 5,811.97 4,068.38 3,487.18
1949 71.4 5,512.82 3,858.97 3,307.69
1950 72.1 5,811.97 4,068.38 3,487.18
1951 77.8 8,347.86 5,773.50 4,948.72
1952 79.5 8,974.36 6,282.05 5,384.61
1953 80.1 9,230.77 6,461.54 5,538.45
1954 80.5 9,401.71 6,581.20 5,641.03
1955 80.2 9,273.50 6,491.45 5,564.10
Totals 65,954.70 46,099.41 39,513.77
* Consumer Price Index numbers from BLS Consumer Price Index, base 1967
=100.
** "Current Dollars" refers to the individual year of computation.
1976] THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY 347
Table VII
Real Judicial Income Lost to Inflation, 1969-1975
Lost Income (Current Dollars) **
Associate Circuit District
Year CPI* Justices Judges Judges
1969 109.8 - -
1970 116.3 $ 3,551.91 $ 2,515.94 $ 2,367.94
1971 121.3 6,284.15 4,451.28 4,189.44
1972 125.3 8,469.95 5,999.54 5,646.63
1973 133.1 12,732.24 9,018.67 8,488.16
1974 147.7 20,710.38 14,669.85 13,806.92
1975 161.2 28,087.43 19,895.26 18,724.95
Totals 79,836.06 56,550.54 53,124.04
* Consumer Price Index numbers from BLS Consumer Price Index, base 1967
= '100.
** "Current Dollars" refers to the individual year of computation.
Table VIII
Cases Terminated in Five-Year Intervals, 1910-1975"
Cases Terminated in Five-Year Intervals, 1910-1975
Circuit Courts
of Appeal
Supreme Cases per District
Court Index Three Judge Index Court Cases Index
Year Cases 1910=100 Panel 1910=100 perJudge 1910=100
1910 400 100.0 132 100.0 321 100.0
1915 539 134.8 135 102.3 411 128.0
1920 602 150.5 129 97.7 536 167.0
1925 761 190.3 216 163.6 1,042 324.6
1930 794 198.5 207 156.8 936 291.6
1935 926 231.5 207 156.8 494 153.9
1940 946 236.5 186 140.9 389 121.2
1945 1,249 312.3 147 111.4 504 157.0
1950 1,301 325.3 141 106.8 416 129.6
1955 1,352 338.0 165 125.0 417 129.9
1960 1,787 446.8 168 127.3 374 116.5
1965 2,173 543.3 231 175.0 331 103.1
1970 3,379 844.8 330 250.0 345 107.5
1975 4,125 1030.5 495 375.0 371 115.6
* Derived from Annual Reports of the Attorney General (1885-1940); Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of (1940-1974); Director,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Management Statistics for United
States Courts (1974. & 1976); Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report, 44
U.S.L.W. 3060 (1975); Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J.
189 (1976).
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Table X
After-Tax Income of Supreme Court Justices in
Five-Year Intervals, 1935-1975
Salary in After-Tax After Tax Salary
Year Nominal Dollars Salary* in 1910 Dollars**
1935 $20,000 $20,000.00t $13,625.30
1940 20,000 18,842.00 12,561.33
1945 20,000 13,605.00 7,067.53
1950 25,000 20,443.78 7,939.33
1955 35,000 26,695.00 9,319.95
1960 35,000 26,695.00 8,426.83
1965 39,500 31,223.90 9,251.53
1970 60,000 43,564.21 10,488.37
1975 63,000 45,925.00 7,977.05
* Federal Income Tax calculated on the assumptions of two personal exemp-
tions, no additional income, and deductions totalling 18 percent of gross
income.
** The deflator is calculated from the BLS Consumer Price Index, base 1967 =
100.
t See note 94 & accompanying text supra.
Table XI
After-Tax Income of Circuit Judges in
Five-Year Intervals, 1935-1975
Salary in After-Tax After-Tax Salary
Year Nominal Dollars Salary* in 1910 Dollars**
1935 $12,500 $12,500.00t $8,515.82
1940 12,500 11,940.10 7,960.07
1945 12,500 9,822.50 5,102.60
1950 17,500 15,744.86 6,114.51
1955 25,500 20,318.60 7,093.78
1960 25,500 20,318.60 6,413.99
1965 33,000 26,670.40 7,902.34
1970 42,500 32,934.70 7,929.25
1975 44,625 34,726.15 6,031.84
* Federal Income Tax calculated on the assumptions of two personal exemp-
tions, no additional income, and deductions totalling 18 percent of gross
income.
** The deflator is calculated from the BLS Consumer Price Index, base 1967 -
100.
t See note 94 & accompanying text supra.
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Table XII



































* Federal income tax calculated on the assumptions of two personal exemp-
tions, no additional income, and deductions totalling 18 percent of gross
income.
** The deflator is calculated from the BLS Consumer Price Index, base 1967 -
100.
t See note 94 & accompanying text supra.
Table XIII
Comparison of Indices of Real Disposable Income (R.D.I.) of Federal
Judges and of the United States Population,








































* Judicial salaries are computed from Table Wy, supra. For years following
1935, the tax bite has been factored out. See note 94 & accompanying text
supra.
** Per capita statistics, 1910 to 1955 are computed from U.S. DEP'T OF COM-MERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO
1957, Series F-6-9, at 139, divided by Series A 22-33, at 8, col. 22 (1960);1965 is computed from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1971 BUSINESS STATISTICS
7, 67; 1975 comes from Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
Year
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
Year
1910
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
